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INTRODUCTION
Administrative proceedings in one country in advance of, or in parallel 
with, criminal proceedings in another country could have the possibility to 
undermine fundamental constitutional protections, such as the privilege 
against self-incrimination and the double jeopardy principle. In the United 
States, criminal and administrative parallel proceedings are generally 
allowed, but evidence obtained through the less demanding procedures 
usually allowed for administrative investigations may not be used in 
criminal proceedings. This is the case if the administrative investigations 
were conducted “solely” to obtain evidence for the criminal proceedings. 
Similar issues could arise in many cross-border cases because parallel 
investigations and exchange of information between multiple countries’ 
securities regulators are the norm in the current global securities markets.  
Assume that an investor residing in one country, where securities 
regulator X oversees the market, commits market manipulation or insider 
trading in another country where securities regulator Y oversees the 
market. Under the current primary cooperation framework among 
securities regulators, the Memorandum of Understanding (“MMoU”), Y 
will likely ask cooperation of X to obtain material documents and 
information regarding the investor. If an administrative investigation by X 
is conducted in parallel with a criminal investigation by Y, can Y use in 
its criminal proceedings or administrative “penalty” proceedings the 
documents and information provided by X without violating the 
constitutional protections in X’s country?  
For example, in 2014, the Japanese Securities regulator took an 
administrative enforcement action to seek an administrative monetary 
penalty payment order against a Hong Kong company that allegedly 
conducted market manipulation in Japan. In response, the company filed 
a lawsuit in Hong Kong against the Hong Kong regulator, claiming that 
the Hong Kong regulator unlawfully provided self-incriminatory evidence 
to the Japanese regulator for its use in administrative proceedings. Under 
Hong Kong law, the securities regulator may not provide self-
incriminatory evidence to a foreign regulator to be used in criminal 
proceedings.
Although Japanese proceedings and its remedies are labeled as 
“administrative proceedings” and “administrative monetary penalties” 
under Japanese law, the investor argued that Japanese proceedings were 
equivalent to criminal proceedings because administrative monetary 
penalties should be construed as a “penalty” under Hong Kong law. This 
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case illustrates the overall questions dealt with in this article: How the 
assertion of privileges or protection associated with criminal proceedings 
in one country may impede the sharing of evidence and information with 
another country to be used in administrative proceedings.
Although many scholars have analyzed the SEC’s enforcement topics 
such as the enhanced authority in, and the increasing use of, administrative 
proceedings, they have focused on domestic issues and have not viewed 
issues from an international perspective. Similarly, much has been 
discussed about issues such as the constitutionality of parallel proceedings 
and accompanying information exchange among U.S. regulators, but 
scholars have largely ignored issues related to cross-border information 
exchange between securities regulators.  The more administrative 
penalties are enhanced, the more likely they would be deemed quasi-
criminal. The more a regulator exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
more likely it would conflict with other countries’ regulators. This article, 
therefore, tries to expand the scope of analysis to the international setting.
I will first examine two constitutional protections provided in criminal 
proceedings, namely protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the privilege against self-incrimination under domestic laws 
of various jurisdictions to see whether such protections are universally 
available. I will then discuss whether the constitutional protections above 
prevent criminal regulators from obtaining information from 
administrative regulators under domestic laws of various jurisdictions. 
Finally, I will show how cross-border information exchange by securities 
regulators could be hindered due to constitutional protections in one 
jurisdiction, and I will also provide solutions. 
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I. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER 
DOMESTIC LAWS
In the United States, constitutional protections of defendants in federal 
criminal proceedings are found in the Fourth,1 Fifth,2 Sixth,3 and Eighth4
Amendments.5 The Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin6 enumerated 
the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings as follows: 
(1) [T]he right to a public trial, (2) the right of confrontation, (3) the right 
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in one’s favor, (4) the 
right to a speedy trial, (5) the right to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation, (6) the right to a jury trial when the possible sentence 
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
5. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “[state shall] deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, many of the constitutional protections are applicable 
to state criminal prosecutions. See Johnathan I. Charney, The Need for Constitutional 
Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalties Cases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 478 (1974) 
(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
6. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
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exceeds six months, and (7) the right to counsel if there is a possibility 
of incarceration.7
Other protections accorded to defendants in criminal proceedings 
include: 
(1) [T]he requirement that there be an official decision to prosecute made 
formally, explicitly, and with notice, (2) the right to have proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) the right to a trial before an impartial trier 
of fact, (4) limitations on unreasonable searches and seizures and the use 
of illegally obtained evidence, and (5) prohibitions against double 
jeopardy.8
Among these fundamental or constitutional protections, two types of 
fundamental protections, protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures and the privilege against self-incrimination, may particularly 
impede cross-border information exchange between securities regulators. 
This section compares domestic laws of fourteen jurisdictions to show that 
most, if not all, member jurisdictions of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) protect individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination.   
A. Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
1. United States
There has been a widespread consensus about the basic meaning of 
each of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment.9
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
7. See Charney, supra note 5, at 478–79 (summarizing enumerated protections) 
(internal citations omitted). 
8. Id. at 479, n.13 (internal citations omitted). 
9. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 557 (1999).
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.10
“The first clause has been understood to state a comprehensive 
principle–that the government shall not violate the ‘right to be secure’ by 
conducting ‘unreasonable searches and seizures.’”11The Supreme Court 
has endorsed this understanding in numerous opinions, asserting, for 
example, that “[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth 
Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise 
of discretion by government officials.”12
“The second clause of the text, which starts with ‘and no Warrants,’ is 
commonly called ‘the Warrant Clause.’”13 It has been understood to serve 
the more specific purpose of regulating warrant authority.14 “Its effect is 
to ban the use of a ‘general warrant’ . . . ([e.g.], ordering a search of 
‘suspected places’), which was also commonly applied to a warrant 
lacking a complaint under oath or an adequate showing of cause.”15 In 
response, Rule 41(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that a magistrate judge or a judge of a state court issue a search 
warrant.16 A magistrate or state judge “must issue the warrant if there is 
probable cause to search for and seize a person or property or to install and 
use a tracking device.”17 It has been well established that “exigent
circumstances,” including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence, 
permit warrantless searches.18
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Davies, supra note 9, at 557.
12. Id.; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979).
13. Davies, supra note 9, at 558.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
18. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011); see also generally Stephen J. 
Kaczynski, The Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence: American and Foreign 
Approaches Compared, 101 MIL. L. REV. 83, 101–02 (providing detailed analysis of 
exigent circumstances).
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2. Comparison of Fourteen Countries
Today, the IOSCO’s membership regulates more than 95% of the 
world’s securities markets in more than 115 jurisdictions.19 I could not find 
any comprehensive research that compares constitutional protections of all 
of the 115 jurisdictions. There is, however, one study published in 2007 
that compiled a description of criminal procedures in twelve countries 
(Argentina, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom).20 Based on this study, I 
will compare laws regarding protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures in fourteen countries consisting of the United States, the twelve 
countries listed above, and Japan as follows. Details of law of each country 
are provided in Appendix A. 
Protection of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures is 
almost universally provided for by requiring the police to obtain a search 
warrant except for limited circumstances. Among domestic laws of the 
fourteen countries, but for two (United Kingdom and France), 
constitutions of all countries explicitly protect the right of individuals in 
securing premises, communication, and privacy.21 For example, Article 18 
of the Argentine National Constitution provides that “dwellings, personal 
correspondence and private documents shall not be violated or trespassed, 
and a statute is to determine in what cases and under what circumstances 
their search and occupation shall be permitted.”22
Although the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, a 
number of rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) became part of English law and took effect in 2000 by virtue 
of the Human Rights Act 1998.23 The Convention rights include the right 
19. IOSCO, FACT SHEET 2 (2019). 
20. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, A WORLDWIDE STUDY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 
2007) [hereinafter WORLDWIDE STUDY].
21. Schlesinger observes that in civil law countries, the police’s power to arrest the 
suspect or conduct searches and seizures without a judicial warrant is generally more 
limited than in the United States, but at least as a rule it is necessary at a very early stage 
of the investigation to involve the prosecutor and the court. Rudolf B. Schlesinger, 
Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L.
REV. 361, 364–65 (1977).
22. Art. 18, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
23. David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20,
at 149.
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not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty,24 and the right to respect for private 
and family life, home, and correspondence.25
In France, there are only a few provisions of individual rights in the 
Constitution, such as the presumption of innocence, and most issues of 
criminal procedure are governed by detailed provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.26 The preliminary article of the Code provides for two 
general principles applicable to all types of investigations: first, official 
investigation should be “fair,” attempting to uncover evidence both 
favorable and unfavorable to the accused, avoiding the use of brutal or 
deceptive methods, and respecting human dignity; second, all 
investigatory steps must be thoroughly documented in writing.27
Although the constitutions of Canada and the United States use the term 
“reasonableness” as a standard of searches and seizures,28 all fourteen 
countries’ constitutions require a search warrant, either under the 
constitution (Germany, Japan, Mexico, and the United States) or under 
criminal procedure laws.29 For example, Article 35 of the Japanese 
Constitution provides: 
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects 
against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon 
warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place 
24. European Convention on Human Rights art. 5, § 1, Nov. 4, 1050, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221 [hereinafter ECHR]
25. ECHR art. 8, § 1. 
26. Richard S. Frase, France, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 205.
27. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [Criminal Procedure Code] art. 1-P, 
30, 82, 100 (Fr.).
28. Even though the governing principles concerning search and seizure are similar 
between the United States and Canada, admissibility of evidence obtained though illegal 
search or seizure is different. See Lewis R. Katz, Reflections on Search and Seizure and 
Illegally Seized Evidence in Canada and the United States, 3 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 103, 103–04 
(1980). In the United States, the court would grant a motion to suppress illegally obtained 
evidence, and without other evidence, the prosecution would be forced to dismiss the 
criminal charges. Id. at 104 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). On the other hand, in Canada, the manner in which evidence 
is secured is largely irrelevant for the criminal trial, and the court may admit illegally seized 
documents. See Katz, supra, at 104. For a more comprehensive comparative study of 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence abroad, see Kaczynski, supra note 18, at 130–
65 (comparing admissibility in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia).
29. See generally WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20.
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to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 
33.30
In Egypt, the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids law enforcement 
officers to conduct warrantless searches of dwellings except in an 
emergency.31
Except for China, where the police may issue a search warrant, and thus 
in practice, the police have almost complete discretion to search and seize, 
all other countries require that a search warrant be issued by the 
prosecution or the judge.32 For example, in Israel, the judge may issue a 
search warrant when the search is necessary to assure the presentation of 
an object for an investigation or trial and if the judge has reason to believe 
the location is used for the storage of a stolen item.33
In all countries examined, however, a search warrant may not be 
necessary if exceptional circumstances exist, including exigency and with 
the consent of the suspect. For example, in Italy, the police may conduct 
warrantless searches in “exigent circumstances” such as when someone is 
committing a crime or has escaped custody.34
30. NIHONKOKU K?????[K????] [CONSTITUTION], art. 35, ¶ 1 (Japan).
31. Sadiq Reza, Egypt, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 120; Law No. 150 
of 1950 (Civil Procedure Code) arts. 45, 91 (Egypt).
32. See generally WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 91, 93.
33. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Israel, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 276; 
Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) Ordinance [New Version], 5729-1969, § 23 (Isr.).
34. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 303, 305; 
C.p.p. art. 352 (It.).
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How searches and seizures are restricted in each country discussed 
above can be summarized as below:
Protected 
under 
Constitution?
“Reasonable”
language?
Protected 
under 
Criminal 
Procedure?
Warrant 
Required?
Argentina Yes Yes Yes
Canada Yes Yes Yes Yes
China Yes Yes Yes
Egypt Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes Yes
Israel Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes
Japan Yes Yes Yes
Mexico Yes Yes Yes
Russia Yes Yes Yes
South 
Africa
Yes Yes Yes
United 
Kingdom
Yes Yes
United 
States
Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Self-Incrimination Privilege
Similar to the comparative study on protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures conducted in the previous section, I will compare 
laws regarding protection of the self-incrimination privilege in the same 
fourteen countries.
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1. United States
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”35 so, a person has the 
right to decline to provide any testimonial evidence that might tend to 
incriminate themselves. The privilege is “one of the great landmarks in 
man’s struggle to make himself civilized’ [and] reflects many of our 
fundamental values and most noble aspirations.”36 A person may refuse to 
answer, not only when she is the criminal defendant, but also “in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory . . . [if she] reasonably believes” the testimony could be used 
against her in a later criminal case.37
There are two main categories of rationales for the privilege.38 First, 
“systemic rationales” include both the encouragement of third-party 
witnesses to testify by removing the fear that they might incriminate 
themselves, as well as the maintenance of official integrity by removing 
temptation to employ short cuts to conviction.39 Second, “individual 
rationales” include avoidance of cruelty and invasion of privacy and the 
inviolability of the human personality and dignity.40
Based on the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Miranda held 
that the police must announce to the criminally accused their rights of 
silence and appointed counsel before any custodial questioning can legally 
commence.41 Today, the police typically provide the following “Miranda
warning”:
(1) You have the right to remain silent. (2) Anything you say can and 
will be used against you in a court of law. (3) You have the right to an 
attorney. (4) If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
36. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citing E. GRISWOLD,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955)).
37. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
38. David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1065–66 (1986).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1066. 
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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you free of charge. Do you understand each of these rights I have read to 
you? Having these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me?42
In addition to requiring these warnings, the Court held that the state 
bore the burden to demonstrate that the suspect’s waiver of these 
constitutional rights was made “voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.”43
2. Comparison of Fourteen Countries
Similar to my analysis regarding the protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in the previous section, I will compare laws 
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination in fourteen countries 
(Argentina, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, the United 
States). Details of the laws of each country are provided in Appendix B.
The privilege against self-incrimination is also almost universally 
provided for in the fourteen countries described above though how they 
are protected and whether it applies to a suspect who has yet to be formally 
charged differs by country. Of domestic laws of the fourteen countries, the 
constitutions of seven countries (Argentina, Canada, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, and the United States) explicitly provide for the self-
incrimination privilege.44 For example, Article 20(2) of the Mexican 
Constitution provides: “In every criminal trial the accused shall enjoy the 
following guarantees: He may not be forced to be a witness against 
himself; wherefore denial of access or other means tending to this end is 
strictly prohibited.”45
42. Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 628 (1996). 
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
44. See Art. 18, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.); Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, § 11(c), Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.).; NIHONKOKU K?????[K????] [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, 
¶ 1 (Japan); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, CPEUM, art. 
20(2), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 08-09-2019 (Mex.); KONSTITUTSIIA 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 (Russ.); S. AFR. CONST., art. 
35, 1996.; U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also generally WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20.
45. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, CPEUM, art. 
20(2), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 08-09-2019 (Mex.).
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In five countries (China, France, German, Israel, and Italy), the code of 
criminal procedure, instead of the constitution, provides for the self-
incrimination privilege. For example, in Italy, if a person not yet a suspect 
reveals incriminating evidence in the course of exchange with the police, 
the police must interrupt the person and warn him that an investigation 
may begin against him.46 Statements made before this warning may not be 
used against the person.47 The suspect must be warned of his right to 
remain silent.48
In Egypt, neither the Constitution nor the Code of Criminal Procedure 
explicitly provides defendants the self-incrimination privilege, but it is 
recognized and enforced in practice.49 The Constitution provides that any 
statement proved to have been compelled by “physical or moral harm” or 
threat to such harm is “null and void.”50 The Code sets forth rules and 
limits on interrogating defendants during the investigative process and 
trial.51 These provisions and court rulings “make it clear that defendants 
have no obligation to answer questions before trial or during it, [and] that 
a defendant’s silence should not be considered evidence of guilt.”52
In the United Kingdom, although there is no written constitution, 
common law recognizes the privilege.53 “Parliament . . . passed legislation 
[to impose] obligation to disclose information to investigators in 
connection with terrorism, serious fraud, and money-laundering 
investigation.”54 Thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights held 
that the use in criminal proceedings of self-incriminating information 
obtained under threat of criminal penalties for non-disclosure breached the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.55 Therefore, “[a]ll legislation providing penalties for non-
46. C.p.p. art. 63 (It.).
47. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 324; Cass. Sez. I, La Placa, March 17, 2000. 
48. C.p.p. art. 64(3) (It.).
49. Reza, supra note 31, at 125.
50. Id.; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 22 Sept. 1971, art. 42.
51. Reza, supra note 31, at 125.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 166.
54. Id. at 167.
55. Feldman, supra note 23, at 167; Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 E.H.R.R. 
313, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (1996).
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disclosure has now been amended to bring it in line with the [decision 
above].”56
In all countries, defendants are protected by the self-incrimination 
privilege, although in China, the scope of the protection is not clear in 
practice. Moreover, in most countries, suspects are afforded similar 
protection against self-incrimination; however, in Argentina, the 
protection is narrower than that for the defendant.57 In France, a suspect 
may not be advised that he has the right to remain silent until he first 
appears before a magistrate who decides whether to formally charge him.58
56. Feldman, supra note 23, at 167.
57. Alejandro D. Carrio & Aljandro M. Garro, Argentina, in WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 20, at 15; CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 234 (Arg.).
58. In comparing the rights of criminal defendants between the United States and 
France, Tomlinson observes that individuals have fewer rights when confronted with 
investigatory authority in France than in the United States. Edward A. Tomlinson, 
Comparative Criminal Justice Issues in the United States, West Germany, England, and 
France: Nonadversarial Justice: the French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 144 (1983). 
On the other hand, the rights of the French criminal defendant at trial may be more 
protected than in the United States because the court controls the disposition of the case 
and the defendant is not subject to pressure from the prosecution to forego his trial rights 
to secure lesser punishment. Id. at 194–95.
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The self-incrimination privilege in each country discussed above can 
be summarized as below:
Protected 
under 
Constitution?
Protected 
Otherwise?
Suspect 
Protected?
Defendant 
Protected?
Argentina Yes Yes Yes
Canada Yes Yes Yes
China Yes Yes Yes
Egypt Yes Yes Yes
France Yes Yes
Germany Yes Yes Yes
Israel Yes Yes Yes
Italy Yes Yes Yes
Japan Yes Yes Yes
Mexico Yes Yes Yes
Russia Yes Yes Yes
South 
Africa
Yes Yes Yes
United 
Kingdom
Yes Yes Yes
United 
States
Yes Yes Yes
There are some comparative studies focused on a few countries and the 
self-incrimination privilege. For example, in comparing the self-
incrimination privilege afforded in the United States, France, and China, 
Michael Profit observes that “the United States’ privilege has the broadest 
application.”59 In China, although a new provision of Criminal Procedure 
Law provides the privilege,60 the privilege protects only those who are 
suspected of committing a crime.61 In France, the privilege applies only to 
59. Michael V. Profit, Refusing to Be One’s Own Witness: How the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination Differs in China, France, and the United States, 8 ELON L. REV.
155, 163 (2016).
60. See infra Appendix B.3 (describing the new law).
61. Profit, supra note 59, at 160.
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the “accused,” meaning those who are already in custody.62 In the United 
States, the Fifth Amendment protects any individuals from being forced to 
reveal information that could possibly result in a criminal proceeding 
against them.63 This breadth may reflect the accusatorial nature of U.S. 
criminal justice system.64
Schlesinger also observes that in almost all civil law countries, no 
physical compulsion may be used to make the suspect talk, and the 
suspect, even before he becomes the defendant, has the right to remain 
silent.65 Pieck also observes, “[a]ll continental West-European countries 
today recognize the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination in one 
form or another.”66 Amann also states, “[a]mong those rights increasingly 
recognized as universal is the privilege against self-incrimination, or right 
to silence.”67
The fact that many international treaties protect individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination corroborates 
the universal acceptance of these protections.68 Common to each 
agreement was a stated commitment to fair and equal treatment of 
individuals and to the protection of individual dignity.69 For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the first instrument to 
enumerate individual rights related to criminal justice, including 
protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or invasions of privacy.70
Article 12 provides: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
62. Id. at 161–62.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Profit, supra note 59 at 163.  
64. Profit, supra note 59, at 163; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) 
(“[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and . . .
the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.”).
65. Schlesinger, supra note 21, at 377. 
66. Manfred Pieck, The Accused’s Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Civil 
Law, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 585 (1962).
67. Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1251 (1998). 
68. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 824 (2000) (arguing that 
multilateral agreements protect fundamental individual rights in criminal procedure).
69. Id.
70. Id.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt.1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”71
Multiple regional human rights conventions have more detailed 
catalogue of such rights.72 For example, article 8(2)(g) of American 
Convention protects “the right not to be compelled to be a witness against 
himself or to plead guilty.”73 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which was adapted by General Assembly of 
the United Nations in 1966, is often described as part of “an international 
Bill of Rights” and includes rights to personal liberty, dignity, and 
privacy.74 “Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR provides: ‘In the determination 
of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled . . . [n]ot to 
be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.’”75
In the next section, I will examine whether and how the two 
constitutional protections—protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and self-incrimination—are afforded in domestic parallel 
proceedings between administrative and criminal regulators.
II. DOMESTIC LAW CONCERNING INFORMATION SHARING IN PARALLEL 
PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL 
REGULATORS
Domestic parallel criminal and administrative proceedings have been 
frequently used not only by U.S. federal regulators76 but also regulators in 
71. Id. art. 12.
72. Amann, supra note 68, at 824. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, arts. 3-7, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59; American Convention 
on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 7–8, 11, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
147–48 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
73. African Charter, art 8(2)(g).
74. Amann, supra note 68, at 825; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). Although 
ICCPR has the potential to lead the development of a global body of constitutional criminal 
procedure, it is not realized. Amann, supra note 68, at 825.
75. ICCPR art. 14(3)(g). 
76. See JOHN S. SIFFERT & JED. S. RAKOFF, BUSINESS CRIME: CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, ¶ 2.01 (2017) (observing a growing trend of parallel 
proceedings); Frederick T. Davis, International Double Jeopardy: U.S. Prosecutions and 
the Developing Law in Europe, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 57, 64 (2016) (observing it is very 
common that the DOJ and the SEC simultaneously investigate the same conduct).
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many jurisdictions.77 Such parallel proceedings, however, may involve a 
risk of infringement of constitutional protection of the fundamental rights 
of individuals.  
“[P]arallel proceedings can weaken a defendant’s due process rights 
because the government, as simultaneous prosecutor and plaintiff, may 
benefit from the more generous discovery opportunities afforded by civil 
proceedings.”78 For example, under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a defendant may not be compelled to disclose materials “made 
by the defendant, or the defendant’s attorney or agent, during the case’s 
investigation or defense” and statements made “to the defendant, or the 
defendant’s attorney or agent, by: (i) the defendant; (ii) a government or 
defense witness; or (iii) a prospective government or defense witness.”79
On the other hand, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may 
discover “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”80
Therefore, there is a risk that more liberal discovery in civil or 
administrative proceedings may be used to gather evidence for a pending 
criminal proceeding. In such a case, parallel proceedings can “put special 
pressure” on a defendant’s self-incrimination privilege.81 In addition, if 
77. See infra Section II.B (describing domestic laws of six jurisdictions restricting 
use of self-incrimination statements in criminal proceedings). In addition, for example, in 
Germany, “[a]lthough multiple criminal investigations are not allowed, different 
government agencies may conduct investigations independently, for instance, the [German 
securities regulator] may lead an inquiry into activities of a bank while the public 
prosecutor investigates the employees of the same bank that acted in those transactions.”
Germany in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH at 2. In Italy, “Unlawful conduct amounting to 
business crime can also be subject to administrative enforcement. In principle, this 
administrative enforcement runs in parallel (and in addition) to the criminal one, in a 
system where specific ‘regulators’ have the power to assess the relevant violations and to 
apply the related administrative sanctions.” Italy in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH at 1.  
78. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1390 (1991); see also SIFFERT & RAKOFF, supra note 
76, ¶ 2.01 (observing that the government may take advantage of liberal civil discovery 
rules and obtain evidence that would not have been otherwise available). 
79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2). Rule 6(e) also generally prohibits the DOJ from 
sharing grand jury materials with the SEC. Id. 6(e)(2). 
80. FED R. CIV. P. 26(b). In addition, as discussed below, the SEC may request any 
materials and information reasonably relevant to the case. See supra Section II.A.1.a.
81. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1389–90. Parallel proceedings can also “undercut a 
defendant’s sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel” when counsel works 
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parallel proceedings end up in imposition of both criminal and civil 
penalties, it would also raise double jeopardy issues.  
In this section, I will compare domestic laws in relation to the use of 
information obtained through an administrative investigation in 
subsequent criminal proceedings. U.S. rules generally allow the use if a 
securities investigation is “not solely” for criminal proceedings and 
distinguish “criminal” and “civil” penalties.82 On the other hand, laws of 
some jurisdictions such as Canada and Hong Kong explicitly provide that 
self-incriminating statements obtained through administrative securities 
investigations may not be used in criminal proceedings.83 The comparative 
study will illustrate the policy grounds and practical consideration 
between such differences.    
A. United States
Constitutional protections in securities enforcement face challenges in 
the following three aspects. First, the SEC exercises a broad investigatory 
authority and uses powerful enforcement tools.84 Second, the SEC may 
seek civil “penalties,” which can be more punitive than criminal penalties, 
in both administrative and civil proceedings.85 Third, in parallel 
proceedings between the DOJ and the SEC, the DOJ may obtain, and use 
in criminal proceedings, information obtained through the SEC’s 
investigation.86 Here, I will examine whether and how individual rights 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination are 
protected in those three aspects. 
1. Constitutional Protections in SEC Enforcement
Here, I will focus on constitutional protections afforded in SEC 
enforcement. As described below, the SEC has a broad investigatory 
authority of investigation and powerful enforcement tools, so its 
vigorously to produce materials for the civil defense, which can hurt the defendant in the 
criminal case. Id. at 1391.
82. See infra II.A.
83. See infra II.B.2, II.B.3.
84. See infra II.A.1.
85. See infra II.A.2.
86. See infra II.A.3.
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enforcement could infringe constitutional protections of targeted parties. 
The federal securities law requires regulated entities such as broker-
dealers subject to inspection by the SEC to produce documents to the SEC 
upon request.87 In an “informal investigation,” the SEC “relies on 
voluntary cooperation to obtain documents and information from [non-
regulated] persons and entities.”88 After an informal investigation turns 
into a “formal investigation” pursuant to an order from the Commission, 
the SEC may issue subpoenas to obtain documents and information.89
Because of these broad powers, the SEC does not seem to rely on searches 
and seizures pursuant to an administrative search warrant.90
a. SEC’s Subpoena Power
Many administrative agencies have been given the authority to issue 
administrative subpoenas, so individuals and businesses may resist a 
request for information as encroaching too far on their right to privacy.91
The administrative subpoena can be used to coerce production of records 
and subpoena witnesses.92
The SEC has a broad authority to issue subpoenas.93 For example, 
under section 19(c) of the Securities Act, “any member of the Commission 
87. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(a), (b) (2017), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-13, 17a-14 (2017).
88. THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 47, 82 (Michael J. Missal & Richard 
M. Philips eds., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL].
89. Id. at 82.
90. See Mark Rumond, EFF to the SEC: Get a Warrant, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION (June 21, 2017) (observing that the SEC lacks the power to obtain a warrant 
by itself but can coordinate with the DOJ to obtain a warrant if there is a criminal 
component to an investigation).
91. See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
528–530 (4th ed. 2004).
92. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942) (“[T]he 
subpoena may, as in this case, be used to compel production at a distant place of practically 
all of the books and records of a manufacturing business.”).
93. Doyle points out that although administrative subpoenas are “not a traditional 
tool of criminal law investigation,” they overlap in a few areas. Charles Doyle, 
Administrative Subpoenas and National Security Letters in Criminal and Foreign 
Intelligence Investigations: Background and Proposed Adjustments, in NATIONAL 
SECURITY ISSUES 5 (Daniel D. Pegarkov ed. 2006). First, failure to comply with an 
administrative subpoena may result in criminal penalties. Id. Particularly in the context of 
administrative subpoenas involving intelligence matters, disclosure of the existence of the 
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or any officer or officers designated by it are empowered to . . . subpoena 
witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, 
or other documents which the Commission deems relevant or material to 
the inquiry.”94
The Supreme Court ruled that an agency seeking to enforce compliance 
with a subpoena must show only “that the investigation will be conducted 
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the 
purpose, that the information sought is not already within the [agency’s] 
possession, and that the administrative steps required by the [federal 
statutes] have been followed.”95 If the agency makes its required showing, 
the opposing party may challenge the subpoena “on any appropriate 
ground.”96
Common grounds for challenging the SEC’s subpoena include 
allegations that the SEC’s investigation is overbroad, burdensome, 
impracticable, or irrelevant, and claims of various privileges.97 If 
challenged, the SEC does not have to show the likelihood of a securities 
violation,98 but must show only that: (1) the inquiry is for a legitimate 
purpose and within the power authorized by the Congress; (2) the 
subpoena was issued in accordance with required administrative 
procedures; and (3) the documents or witness were not “plainly 
incompetent or irrelevant for any lawful purpose.”99
subpoena may lead to criminal penalties. Id. Second, because a violation of laws subject to 
administrative enforcement, such as securities regulation, oftentimes is subject to criminal 
enforcement, evidence collected pursuant to an administrative subpoena may unearth 
evidence for criminal prosecution. Id.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (2017); see also SEC, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 3.2.6 (2016) [hereinafter SEC MANUAL] (“The Commission or 
its designated officers may require the production of any records deemed relevant or 
material to the inquiry and may require their production from any place in the United 
States.”).
95. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964); but see SEC v. Murray 
Dir. Affiliates, 426 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the SEC may enforce 
compliance with subpoena even if the SEC has requested the same information from two 
other sources). 
96. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58. 
97. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 108.
98. Id. (citing SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 
1980)). 
99. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 108–09 (citing Endicott Johnson 
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)); see also Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 
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The courts have rarely refused to enforce a subpoena as unreasonably 
broad in scope.100 For example, a subpoena was denied because it required 
“mass removal of business records.”101 A court refused to enforce an SEC 
subpoena based on information obtained by SEC staff members who 
pretended to be seeking general background on industry practices but in 
fact conducted an informal investigation for enforcement.102 Thus, the 
SEC may not mislead a firm during an inspection either. 
b. Fourth Amendment and Inspection Powers
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable search and seizure: 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”103 The Supreme Court emphasized that protection against 
arbitrary invasion of privacy is “at the core of the Fourth Amendment.”104
Administrative searches are very common, and they may present 
challenges to the right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.105
U.S. 186, 202, 209 (1946) (observing that the Fourth Amendment does not directly apply 
to subpoenas because they do not involve “actual searches and seizures” but ruling in 
analogy that probable cause required in warrant is satisfied in case of subpoenas if “the 
investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the 
documents sought are relevant to the inquiry”). Persaud, however, points out that as to the 
standard for reasonableness in issuing administrative subpoenas, the courts have not 
articulated a clear rational for the use of information collected by an administrative agency 
for a subsequent criminal proceeding. Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations 
Between Administrative and Law Enforcement Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 
DAYTON L. REV. 77, 99 (2013); see also infra Section II.A.3 (discussing the 
constitutionality of parallel criminal and administrative proceedings). 
100. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 30.
101. SEC v. Sange, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975).
102. See SEC v. ESM Gov’t Sec. Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that “fraud, deceit or trickery is grounds for denying enforcement of an administrative 
subpoena”). 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Section II.A.2.b (discussing how the Fourth 
Amendment applies to civil penalty proceedings generally). 
104. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
105. WARREN, supra note 91, at 527. Though some administrative officials have 
discretionary authority to arrest and detain a person, such administrative arrests and 
detentions have been rare. Id.
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As a general rule, administrative officials must obtain a search warrant 
to forcibly inspect an individual or company without consent.106 The 
Supreme Court, however, held that “[p]robable cause in the criminal law 
sense is not required” for an administrative search warrant.107 “[P]robable 
cause justifying the issuance of [an administrative] search warrant may be 
based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a 
showing that ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards for 
conducting an . . . inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular 
[establishment].’”108 The Supreme Court observed that: “A warrant . . . 
would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is 
reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant 
to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.”109 In 
contrast, if a business is already closely supervised by a regulatory agency, 
it is reasonable to exempt such business from the search warrant 
requirement.110
The SEC has broad powers to conduct inspections and examinations of 
books and records required to be kept by regulated firms, such as broker-
dealers, investment advisers, and investment companies.111 The courts 
have held that administrative agencies’ power to inspect and examine does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as: (1) the inspection pertains 
106. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (“[A] search of 
private property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by 
a valid search warrant.”).
107. Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
108. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320–21 (citing Camara, 387 U.S. at 538).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) 
(“[With respect to] the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and inspection . . . 
Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and 
seizures.”); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703–12 (1987) (finding that vehicle 
dismantlers were part of a closely regulated industry that carries a reduced expectation of 
privacy, thereby lessening the application of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable 
cause requirements); People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 501–502 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that 
warrantless search was unconstitutional if it was not supported by the exigency of hot 
pursuit or the existence of a business that was closely regulated); Burger, 482 U.S. at 719 
(Brennan , J., dissenting) (arguing that vehicle-dismantling business is not closely 
regulated, and an administrative warrant therefore was required to search it).
111. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 29. In 1975, statutes were amended 
to allow the SEC to examine all books and records kept by the regulated firms. See also
WARREN, supra note 91, at 31.
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to a regulated commercial business; (2) “the examination is relevant to the 
regulatory purposes”; (3) the “scope is clearly defined and limited”; and 
(4) the scope is known to the regulated businesses.112 In particular, the 
Second Circuit upheld the SEC’s power to inspect and examine the 
regulated entities, reasoning that legislative history indicates that the 
availability of records for inspection was necessary for effective regulation 
and such records were deemed “characteristic of quasi-public documents 
and their disclosure may be compelled without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.”113 The SEC takes the position that its inspection and 
examination authority is unlimited “except for the requirement that any 
such [inspection and] examination be ‘reasonable.’”114
c. Self-Incrimination Privilege
The Supreme Court observed that “the Fifth Amendment does not 
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of 
incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to 
make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”115 Rather, “[i]t 
is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips of the 
accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him 
to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might 
incriminate him.”116 The term “witness,” therefore, has generally been 
112. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 29 (citing Colonnade Catering Corp. 
v. United States, 410 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1969) rev’d on other grounds, 397 U.S. 72 
(1970)). Practitioners, however, find that these limitations are more “theoretical” and 
advise that the regulated firms should “do whatever is appropriate to demonstrate a ‘low 
risk’ profile.” ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 29. They also find that it is 
appropriate to negotiate more reasonable bounds to an information request for which 
compliance is extremely difficult or impossible. Id. at 31. 
113. SEC v. Olsen, 354 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1965) (internal citation omitted). 
114. See Lori Richards & John Walsh, Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 52 BUS. L. 119, 129 (1996) (citing Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,278, 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P 26,152A, at 19,183 (Oct. 12, 1979)). 
The SEC may take disciplinary action against a regulated firm’s refusal to make recodes 
available for inspection. See In re Hamon Capital Mgmt. Corp., 47 SEC 426 (Jan 8, 1981) 
(affirming suspension of the investment adviser registration).
115. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
116. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). 
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construed to mean a person providing testimonial evidence.117 The 
privilege extends to a testimony that might “furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.”118
Although the privilege is considered available throughout SEC 
investigations and enforcement actions as long as there is a reasonable 
basis for believing that an answer to question is incriminating,119 the 
privilege cannot be asserted to preclude production of documents such as 
books and records that are required to be maintained by law.120
The privilege is available to individuals and sole proprietorships, but 
not to legal entities such as corporations and partnerships because it is a 
personal privilege solely for natural persons.121 In SEC v. Dunlop,122 the 
court ruled that the self-incrimination privilege applies to Dunlop in his 
“personal capacity” but not in his “business capacity” because Dunlop is 
the controlling person of the business entity.123
Even if the self-incrimination privilege applies in an SEC investigation, 
practitioners caution that invoking the privilege may substantially increase 
the risk of enforcement.124 The SEC can infer from an assertion of the 
privilege that the asserting party willfully violated securities laws, and on 
such a basis can commence a proceeding to suspend or bar the asserting 
party from participating in the securities business.125 No adverse inference 
can be drawn upon an assertion of the self-incrimination privilege in a 
117. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000) (“The word ‘witness’ in 
the constitutional text limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating 
communications to those that are ‘testimonial’ in character.”)
118. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
119. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 93. However, whether the self-
incrimination privilege is generally available in civil penalty proceedings is not clear. See
Section II.A.2.b (discussing two Supreme Court cases, which seem inconsistent).
120. SEC v. Olsen, 354 F.2d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 1965) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment 
privilege cannot be invoked to withhold the records from the agency but can only be raised 
as a bar to a criminal prosecution if any is ever brought.”).
121. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (“The constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural 
individuals.”); ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 93.
122. 253 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 2001). 
123. Id. at 774–75. 
124. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 94.
125. Id. (citing SEC v. Muselia, 578 F. Supp. 425 429–30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding 
that the court could draw an adverse inference from defendants’ refusal to testify because 
the proceeding was civil)).  
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criminal proceeding.126 If the SEC imposes sanctions that are “inherently 
coercive” automatically only upon the assertion of the privilege, it is also 
arguably unconstitutional.127 Practitioners, however, find that this 
argument will unlikely be successful in SEC enforcement because the 
adverse inference is unlikely to be the only evidence.128
2. Application to Civil Penalty Proceedings 
In the United States, the growth of the administrative state and a desire 
to avoid the complication of criminal proceedings have contributed to the 
increasing use of civil penalties.129 Although the SEC is a federal 
“administrative” agency, the SEC may seek civil “penalties” in either civil 
proceedings or administrative proceedings.130 Civil penalties, however, 
can be more severely punitive than criminal sanctions.131 If so, should 
constitutional protections be afforded in those “punitive” civil penalty 
proceedings? Here, I will explore how a “penalty” aspect of the remedy 
affects constitutional protections. My analysis is primarily based on U.S. 
law, but findings such as the rationale of, and problems caused by, civil 
penalty proceedings should be generally applicable to those jurisdictions 
that have civil or administrative penalty proceedings. 
a. Line Between Criminal and Civil Proceedings
How to balance societal and individual rights has presented one of the 
toughest challenges to regulators.132 Some have argued that the protection 
126. Michell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1999) (“The normal rule in a 
criminal case is that no negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify is 
permitted.”). 
127. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 95 n.187 (citing SEC v. Gilbert, 79 
F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding that an adverse inference that would not automatically 
cause a finding of liability is not unconstitutional)). 
128. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 95 n.187. 
129. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1844 (1992).
130. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 7–8.
131. See id. at 1797–98 (arguing that plaintiffs in civil cases sometimes seek 
“punitive” civil sanctions, which purpose is to punish wrongdoing).
132. WARREN, supra note 91, at 515.
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of individual rights has not kept pace with the rapid expansion of 
administrative agencies.133?
Some constitutional protections are explicitly limited to “any criminal 
case” or “all criminal prosecutions.” For example, the Fifth Amendment 
provides that “[no person] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”134 The Sixth Amendment also provides that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defense.”135
In contrast, some other constitutional protections are limited to “suits
at common law” or civil proceedings. For example, the Seventh 
Amendment provides as follows: “In suits at common law, where the value 
in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in 
any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”136
Cheh, therefore, argues that the Constitution draws fundamental 
distinctions between criminal and civil proceedings.137 She observes that 
because of such a distinction, the Constitution, statutes, and the common 
law separate criminal and civil proceedings by “employing different rules 
of procedure, burdens of proof, rules of discovery, investigatory practices, 
and modes of punishment.”138
The line between criminal and civil cases, however, has not been clear 
under case law.139 The Supreme Court has struggled to draw the line.140
Cheh observes the dilemma in drawing the line as follows:
If “criminal case” is defined too broadly, then the cumbersome baggage 
of criminal procedure will be carried into a wide range of government 
and private lawsuits. If it is defined too narrowly, then the values that 
133. Id. at 516.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
135. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). 
137. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1325.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1329–30 (“[A]ttempting to fit all cases neatly into one category or the 
other, though sometimes necessary and useful, can cause a good deal of mischief.”).
140. Id. at 1330 (“[T]he Supreme Court sometimes has struggled to unravel its 
doctrine from the tangled embrace of dichotomy.”).
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underlie various constitutional provisions will be sacrificed simply 
because they arise in a proceeding denominated as civil.141
b. Problem of Civil Penalty Proceedings
The legislature started adopting civil penalties rapidly during the 
middle of the twentieth century, and since then Congress has increased the 
size of civil penalties and made the imposition of them procedurally 
easier.142 The main reason for the increasing use of civil penalties is the 
growth of the administrative state in which Congress has steadily 
increased both the number of administrative agencies and their powers to 
seek civil penalties.143
Imposition of civil penalties is cheaper and more efficient than 
imposition of criminal penalties because civil penalties are not constrained 
by criminal procedure.144 The government has expanded “the arsenal of 
weapons available to reach antisocial behavior” by employing civil 
penalty proceedings.145 The government’s enforcement has become more 
efficient because civil penalty proceedings enable “speedy solutions that 
are unencumbered by the rigorous constitutional protections associated 
141. Id.
142. K. Mann, supra note 129, at 1844. 
143. Id. at 1849–50. He observes that “[w]hen punitive civil sanctions were 
proposed in Congress, they were considered an alternative to criminal prosecution. 
Lawmakers thought criminal law was overly complex, oversensitive to political influence, 
and inefficient—an obstacle to effective law enforcement.” Id. at 1853. 
144. Id. at 1798. He argues that in many cases the motivation to introduce civil 
penalties has been to avoid criminal procedural protection. Coffee also observes that 
“procedural informality” of civil penalty proceedings benefit the prosecution. John C. 
Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Models – And What 
Can Be Done about It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1887 (1992). He argues that, compared to 
criminal proceedings, civil penalty proceedings have numerous advantages such as 
“informal rules of procedure and evidence . . . the ability to prove their cases simply by a 
preponderance of the evidence [and evasion of] the jury’s ability to nullify an overly harsh 
law.” Id. at 1887–88. Coffee concludes that “civil penalties, particularly when 
administratively imposed, could provide the means for evading constitutional safeguards.”
Id. at 1888. 
145. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1329.
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with criminal trials, such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, 
and appointment of counsel.”146
Civil penalties also protect society from both underenforcement and 
overenforcement.147 As Mann argues, civil penalties prevent 
underenforcement by providing punitive sanctions for conduct that is not 
severe enough to justify criminal penalties, and prevent overenforcement 
by providing noncriminal sanctions for conduct that is so severe that it is 
unreasonable to impose only remedial sanctions.148
Because civil penalties are sometimes more severely punitive than 
criminal sanctions, they have replaced a significant part of criminal 
enforcement.149 According to Mann, civil penalties form a 
“middleground” or “hybrid” jurisprudence in which the purpose is 
punishment but the procedure is primarily civil.150 Mann summarizes the 
criminal and civil paradigms in his article. In criminal proceedings, wrong 
is defined as violation of public norms, admissibility of evidence is 
restrictive, the burden of proof is high, and the purpose is punishment.151
On the other hand, in civil proceedings, wrong is defined as actual injury 
to private interests, admissibility of evidence is inclusive, the burden of 
proof is lower, and the purpose is restitution and compensation.152 Mann 
argues that civil penalties mix the characteristics of the civil and criminal 
paradigms.153 Mann’s argument begs the question, how have U.S. courts 
applied constitutional protections in civil penalty proceedings?
c. Case Law in the United States
146. Id. Note that legislators and prosecutors, however, have sometimes tried to 
devise various methods, such as changing the labels of the statutes, to circumvent the 
constitutional protections and escape the burdens of criminal proceedings. Charney, supra
note 5, at 480. For example, the legislatures have changed many criminal sanctions to civil 
penalties. Id. at 481.
147. K. Mann, supra note 129, at 1865.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1798.
150. Id. at 1799. 
151. Id. at 1813. 
152. Id. Cheh also observes that while criminal proceedings emphasize adjudication 
of guilt with strict constitutional protections for the accused, civil proceedings emphasize 
the rights and obligation of private parties. Cheh, supra note 78, at 42.
153. K. Mann, supra note 129, at 1813. 
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Fourth Amendment protections apply to noncriminal regulatory or 
administrative searches.154 It is because “the fourth amendment’s concern 
with invasions of privacy and arbitrary governmental intrusions can arise 
in both [the] criminal and noncriminal contexts.”155
The express language of the Fifth Amendment provides that the self-
incrimination privilege applies only to criminal cases.156 The Supreme 
Court, however, has not confined the privilege to protecting a defendant 
in a criminal trial. For example, the privilege applies to proceedings 
leading to a criminal trial, such as grand jury proceedings157 and in-custody 
interrogation.158 Witness in a governmental civil proceeding can also 
invoke the self-incrimination privilege.159
Whether the self-incrimination privilege applies to defendants in civil 
penalty proceedings, however, is not clear. In Boyd v. United States,160 the 
Supreme Court suggested the self-incrimination privilege applies to civil 
penalty proceedings. The Court found that “[because] suits for penalties 
and forfeitures, incurred by the law, . . . are of this quasi-criminal nature,
. . . they are within the reason of the criminal proceedings for all purposes 
of the [F]ourth [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution, and [the self-
incrimination privilege].”161
154. Charney, supra note 5, at 490 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 
(1886)); see also Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) 
(holding that Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for an administrative inspection of a 
personal residence); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967) (holding that Camara applies 
to business property).
155. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1371. The Fourth Amendment may also apply to a 
wrongful search or seizure conducted by a private party if a private citizen’s actions are 
regarded as having acted as an “instrument” or agent of the state. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
157. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1977). 
158. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
159. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977); see also Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (holding that witness 
can claim the self-incrimination privilege in any federal, state, or local proceeding for any 
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding). Warren, however, argues that the self-
incrimination privilege has been applied so narrowly that the protection in actuality is not 
as great as expected. WARREN, supra note 91, at 500.
160. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
161. Id. at 634. 
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Applying the reasoning of Boyd, the Supreme Court in Lees v. United 
States162 held that the defendant could not be compelled to be a witness 
against himself in an action to recover a penalty under the act prohibiting 
the importation of aliens because though in form a civil action, “[it] is 
unquestionably criminal in its nature.”163 In United States v. Ward,
however, the Supreme Court held that the privilege did not apply to the 
government proceeding to impose a 500-dollar penalty against a person 
who spilled oil into the river.164 The Court found that the proceeding was 
not “‘so far criminal in [its] nature’ as to trigger the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.”165
Although “[t]he Court has not provided a clear or detailed justification 
for the conflicting results of Ward and Boyd”,166 Cheh argues that the 
following rule emerges by analyzing various Supreme Court cases: 
A person may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in any civil 
proceeding where she is accused of having engaged in conduct that 
constitutes a crime or a public offense and in which she faces penalties 
162. 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
163. Id. at 480–83 (citing Boyd).
164. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 246–47, 253–55 (1980).
165. Id. at 253–54 (alteration in original).
166. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1387. The Supreme Court has taken different 
approaches for different constitutional protections at different times. Charney criticizes the 
Supreme Court on the ground that “there is no unifying thread running through either the 
theories or the cases in which [constitutional protections] have been applied.” Charney, 
supra note 5, at 491. Cheh argues that whether constitutional protections apply to civil and 
administrative proceedings should depend on whether protections are procedural or 
substantial. She argues that “strictly” procedures protections, such as the right to jury trial, 
the right to appoint counsel, and the due process requirements of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the presumption of innocence, should be limited to criminal cases. Cheh, supra
note 78, at 1331, 1369. On the other hand, she argues that substantial protections, such as 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, double jeopardy, and self-
incrimination, should not be confined to criminal cases. Id. Mann argues that instead civil 
penalties as middleground sanctions should be accorded a hybrid procedural protection. K. 
Mann, supra note 129, at 1870. He argues that Congress and the Supreme Court, however, 
have used a “bipolar distinction” of criminal and civil cases when considering procedural 
protections in civil penalty proceedings. Id.
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traditionally associated with criminal punishment -- that is, fines or 
incarceration.167
Cheh argues that such a rule is consistent with Ward and Boyd, and the 
privilege would apply “to proceedings to exact statutory penalties which . 
. . are grossly disproportionate to the harms caused.”168
3. Parallel Proceedings by DOJ and SEC
Parallel criminal proceedings by the DOJ and administrative or civil 
proceedings by the SEC are generally permissible. The Supreme Court has 
ruled that “the government may conduct parallel civil and criminal 
investigations without violating the due process clause, so long as it does 
not act in bad faith.”169 The Court also suggested that government may be 
held to have acted in bad faith if it brings a civil action “solely to obtain 
evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant 
in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution.”170
In SEC v. Dresser Industries, Inc., the appellant challenged the SEC for 
execution of a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that there was 
simultaneous criminal litigation by the DOJ.171 The D.C. Circuit refused 
to bar the SEC subpoena, noting that:
The civil and regulatory laws of the United States frequently overlap 
with the criminal laws, creating the possibility of parallel civil and 
criminal proceedings, either successive or simultaneous. In the absence 
of substantial prejudice to the rights of the parties involved, such parallel 
proceedings are unobjectionable under our jurisprudence.172
167. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1388 (citing, for example, United States v. United 
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721–22 (1971) (holding that the fifth amendment 
protection applies when a forfeiture statute viewed in its entirety is “intended to impose a 
penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.”)).
168. Cheh, supra note 78, at 1388.
169. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2008). 
170. Id. at 137. (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1970)).
171. 628 F.2d 1368, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
172. Id. at 1374; see also SEC v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 
1981) (“The simultaneous prosecution of civil and criminal actions is generally 
unobjectionable because the federal government is entitled to vindicate the different 
interests promoted by different regulatory provisions.”).
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The court, however, observed that “the strongest cases for deferring 
civil proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings” included 
the following two cases.173 First case is “where there is specific evidence 
of agency bad faith or malicious governmental tactics.”174 Second case is 
“[where the] noncriminal proceeding, if not deferred, might undermine the 
party’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, expand 
rights of criminal discovery . . . , expose the basis of the defense to the 
prosecution in advance of criminal trial, or otherwise prejudice the 
case.”175 The court also added that the deferral should not seriously injure 
the public interest.176
The Attorney General explains the DOJ policy regarding the parallel 
proceedings as follows:
Department policy is that criminal prosecutors and civil trial counsel 
should timely communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with one another 
and agency attorneys to the fullest extent appropriate to the case and 
permissible by law, whenever an alleged offense or violation of federal 
law gives rise to the potential for criminal, civil, regulatory, and/or 
agency administrative parallel (simultaneous or successive) 
proceedings.177
173. Dresser Indus. Inc., 628 F.2d at 1375–76.
174. Id. at 1375.
175. Id. at 1376.
176. Id.
177. Memorandum from the Attorney General to All United States Attorneys, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, All Assistant United States Attorneys, All 
Litigating Divisions, and All Trial Attorneys (Jan. 30, 2012) (available at 
https://www.nsf.gov/oig/outreach/suspension_workshop/AG%20Holder%2001-30-
2012%20Memorandum.pdf) [hereinafter Memorandum from the Attorney General]. The 
memo argued the legitimacy of parallel proceedings by relying on the cases such as 
Stringer, Kordel, and Dresser. Id.; see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) 
(“It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a government agency . . . 
invariably to choose either to forego recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it 
seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal trial.”); 
Dresser Indus. Inc., 628 F.2d at 1374 (“In the absence of substantial prejudice to the rights 
of the parties involved, such parallel proceedings are unobjectionable under our 
jurisprudence.”); United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (“There is 
nothing improper about the government undertaking simultaneous criminal and civil 
investigations.”).
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The memo emphasized the importance of coordination and information 
sharing because “[i]f the government does not consider and properly 
manage potential parallel matters, it may not be able to realize all of the 
remedies available to the United States.”178
Many other federal agencies set similar internal policies encouraging 
the use of parallel criminal and civil proceedings.179 A memo of the 
Environmental Protection Agency says that the parallel proceedings are 
appropriate “where the violations merit the deterrent and retributive effects 
of criminal enforcement, yet a civil action is also necessary to obtain an 
appropriate remedial result, and where the magnitude or range of the 
environmental violations and the available sanctions [support the parallel 
proceedings].”180
Similarly, Environment & Natural Resources Division of the DOJ 
stated in its policy that “[w]hen it appears that a parallel proceeding may 
be appropriate, civil and criminal attorneys should exchange information 
and evidence received from agencies as early as possible in the process, 
conduct joint investigations where appropriate, and consult together on an 
ongoing basis.”181 Further, the SEC’s Enforcement Manual encourages its 
staff “to work cooperatively with criminal authorities, to share 
information, and to coordinate their investigations with parallel criminal 
investigations when appropriate.”182
A former director of the SEC also noted regarding the parallel 
proceedings between the SEC and the DOJ as follows:
[A]s long as we are making decisions for ourselves - independent of the 
criminal interest - and we do not use one another’s investigative powers 
and processes to advantage the other’s interest, then we are okay. This is 
because [courts] recognize that there are efficiencies to be achieved 
where the government is asking for information. But what the courts do 
178. Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 177, at 2. 
179. Patricia M. Sulzbach & Christopher B. Clare, Navigating the Government’s 
Use of Parallel Proceedings, 41 LITIG. 23, 24 (2014).
180. Memorandum from Granta Y. Nakayama to Regional Administrators, 
Regional Counsel, Regional Enforcement Directors, and OECA Office Directors (Sept. 24, 
2007) (available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/parallel-
proceedings-policy-09-24-07.pdf).
181. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Environment & Natural Resources Division Directive 
2008-02, Parallel Proceedings Policy at § III(2) (2008).
182. SEC MANUAL, supra note 94, § 5.2.1.
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not want to see us doing is blending our processes in a way that would 
work potential unfairness to the disadvantage of the people that we 
investigate.183
a. Communication between DOJ and SEC
The SEC has two processes for the referral of criminal cases to the DOJ: 
a formal process and an informal process. In a formal process, SEC staff 
prepares a criminal reference report for the Commission, which decides 
whether to refer the case to the DOJ.184 The formal process, however, is 
rarely used.185 In the informal process, SEC staff may discuss a nonpublic 
investigation with DOJ prosecutors with prior approval of a senior official 
of the Enforcement Division.186 Upon a written request from the DOJ, the 
Enforcement Division of the SEC may share its investigative files with the 
DOJ.187 SEC staff also often communicates with DOJ prosecutors 
informally, which may lead to a request for the investigative files.188 It is 
also very common that the DOJ and the SEC simultaneously investigate a 
party on the same conduct.189
Parties subject to parallel criminal and administrative proceedings, 
however, may worry that information given to the SEC could be used by 
the DOJ in contravention of the constitutional protections. The SEC has a 
broad authority to issue subpoenas to call witnesses, take evidence, and 
require the production of documents,190 and to conduct inspections and 
examinations of books and records required to be kept by regulated 
firms.191 The self-incrimination privilege cannot be asserted to preclude 
183. Panel: The SEC’s Perspective, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 519, 525-26 (2013)
(alterations in original).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2017). 
185. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 394. 
186. 17 C.F.R § 203.2 (2017). 
187. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-4(a)(7) (2017). 
188. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 394. Practitioners observe that 
because of rare use of the formal process, there is a lack of consistency in case referrals to 
the DOJ, which in turn makes it more difficult to assess the likelihood of a criminal 
prosecution. Id.
189. Davis, supra note 76, at 64; see also ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 
401 (observing that the parallel enforcement investigations are “the norm and can be 
challenging to defend”). 
190. See supra Section II.A.1.a (describing SEC’s subpoena power).
191. See supra Section II.A.1.b (describing SEC’s inspection powers).
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production of documents such as books and records that are required to be 
maintained by law.192
Though due process challenges have rarely been successful, two recent 
cases suggest that the SEC and the DOJ may not work too closely to use 
each other’s enforcement without proper notice to the target.193
b. Scrushy 
In United States v. Scrushy, the district court held that the SEC and the 
DOJ improperly colluded and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress 
testimony.194 In that case, the SEC investigated a company called 
HealthSouth for false and omitted statements in its financial statements.195
The SEC worked with the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in preparing 
for a deposition of Scrushy, HealthSouth’s CEO, without notifying 
Scrushy that he was the target of a criminal investigation.196 The SEC 
moved the place of the deposition from Georgia to Alabama upon request 
from the USAO.197 During the deposition, the SEC did not ask certain 
questions upon USAO’s request to conceal USAO’s involvement but 
asked questions based on information given by the USAO.198
The federal district court in Alabama found that the SEC and the DOJ 
departed from the proper administration of justice because they 
192. See ENFORCEMENT MANUAL supra note 88, at 108–09 (citing Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943)); see also Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 
U.S. 186, 202, 209 (1946) (observing that the Fourth Amendment does not directly apply 
to subpoenas because they do not involve “actual searches and seizures” but ruling in 
analogy that probable cause required in warrant is satisfied in case of subpoenas if “the 
investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the 
documents sought are relevant to the inquiry.”); see also Persaud, supra note 99, at 99. 
Persaud, however, points out that as to the standard for reasonableness in issuing 
administrative subpoenas, the courts have not articulated a clear rational for the use of 
information collected by an administrative agency for a subsequent criminal proceeding. 
Id.; see also Section II.A.3 (discussing the constitutionality of parallel criminal and 
administrative proceedings).
193. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 402. 
194. United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
195. Id. at 1136–37.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1136.
198. Id. at 1136–37.
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“manipulated the simultaneous investigations for [their] own purposes.”199
The court emphasized that the SEC and the DOJ failed to notify Scrushy 
and his attorneys that Scrushy was the target of the criminal investigation, 
that the SEC staff in effect had been pulled into the criminal investigation, 
and that the deposition was moved to Alabama for criminal venue 
purposes.200
c. Stringer
In United States v. Stringer, the district court reached a similar 
conclusion, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.201 In that case, the SEC 
commenced an investigation of former executives, including Stringer, of 
FLIR Systems, Inc. (“Defendants”), for securities fraud while the Oregon 
USAO had been conducting a criminal investigation of the Defendants.202
The SEC, the USAO, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation met to 
discuss the investigations and decided to hold off criminal investigations 
so that the SEC could obtain statements from the Defendants.203 The 
USAO closely cooperated with SEC’s interview of the Defendant, having 
regular meetings and giving instructions on how to question the 
Defendants.204 The SEC and the USAO, however, wanted to conceal the 
USAO’s involvement.205 In response to questions from Stringer’s attorney 
about the USAO’s involvement, the SEC staff answered that “it is the 
agency’s policy not to respond to questions like that, but instead, to direct 
you to the other agencies you mentioned [i.e., the USAO].”206 The SEC 
staff also attached Form 1662 to the subpoenas, containing the following 
language:
Information you give may be used against you in any federal . . . civil or 
criminal proceeding brought by the Commission of any other agency. 
199. Id. at 1140.
200. Id. at 1139.
201. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’g 408 F. Supp. 
2d 1083, 1088–89 (D. Or. 2006) (finding that the government’s tactic violated defendants’
due process and Fifth Amendment rights).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 934.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 935. 
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You may refuse, in accordance with the rights guaranteed to you by the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, to give any 
information that may tend to incriminate you or subject you to fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture.207
None of the Defendants invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination during the depositions.208
The district court found that “the government engaged in deceit and 
trickery to keep the criminal investigation concealed” and granted the 
Defendants’ motion to suppress statements made during the depositions.209
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the decision, holding that “the 
government’s conduct does not amount to a constitutional violation under 
either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.”210 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
a standard form sent to the defendants, Form 1662, sufficiently disclosed 
that the information received by the SEC could be used for criminal 
proceedings.211 The Ninth Circuit found that the government conduct did 
not amount to “deceit or an affirmative misrepresentation”, and at most it 
was merely “a government decision not to conduct the criminal 
investigation openly.”212 The Ninth Circuit also noted that the fact that the 
SEC began its civil investigation before contacting the USAO tend to 
“negate any likelihood that the government began the civil investigation 
in bad faith, as, for example, in order to obtain evidence for a criminal 
prosecution.”213
d. Other Cases
207. Id. at 934–35.
208. Id. at 935.
209. United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1089, 1092, rev’d, 535 F.3d 
929 (9th Cir. 2008).
210. Stringer, 535 F.3d at 932.
211. Id. at 934.
212. Id. at 932.
213. Id. at 939. The Ninth Circuit provided, as “a clear example of government bad 
faith”, a case in which the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service interviewed the 
defendant to collect evidence for criminal false statements though it had already 
determined that the defendant was not eligible for citizenship. Id. at 939 (citing United 
States v. Carriles, 486 F. Supp. 2d 599, 619-20 (W.D. Tex. 2007)). 
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The government seems to be able to deceive a defendant if they do not 
lie, and in some cases, it seems the government may even lie.214 For 
example, in one case, the U.S. Coast Guard told the captain of a ship that 
it conducts routine administrative examinations but concealed the truth 
that there was a parallel criminal investigation.215 The captain filed a 
motion to suppress any statements he made during the inspection, claiming 
that he was deceived by the Coast Guard, but the federal district court in 
Alabama disagreed.216 The court reasoned the Coast Guard did not deceive 
the captain because it actually performed the inspections and only 
remained silent about the criminal investigation, which did not amount to 
an affirmative misrepresentation.217
In another case, the government conducted wastewater testing and 
investigated a company books under search warrants.218 The government 
then lied to the defendants that the testing was routine monitoring.219 The 
defendants later tried to suppress the evidence, but the District Court 
denied the motion, reasoning that the defendants could not have done 
anything different even if they knew the true purpose of the testing because 
the testing was conducted under the search warrants.220
e. Practice and Criticism
As it stands, U.S. case law seems to allow the SEC and the DOJ to 
conduct parallel administrative and criminal investigations and exchange 
information in securities enforcement unless they do not act in bad faith.221
214. See Sulzbach & Clare, supra note 179, at 25.
215. United States v. La Forgia, No. 12-0057-WS-C, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71019 
at *8 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2012).
216. Id. at *14.
217. Id. at *16. The court further ruled that “the presence or absence of a nefarious 
motive is of no consequence to the analysis.” Id. at *25. This ruling might be overstated 
because, for example, the Ninth Circuit in Stringer implied that the government may not 
begin a civil investigation in bad faith to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. See
Stringer, 535 F.3d at 939; see also SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (observing that “the strongest cases for deferring civil proceedings until after 
completion of criminal proceedings [includes] where there is specific evidence of agency 
bad faith or malicious governmental tactics.”).
218. United States v. Rosenblum, No. 07-294 (JRT/FLN), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
96607 at *3–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2007).
219. Id. at *7, *13.
220. Id. at *23–24.
221. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970).
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The table below summarizes when the government’s conduct would likely 
be construed as “acting in bad faith” under U.S. case law.  
SEC DOJ
Likely Bad 
Faith
Conduct investigation 
solely to obtain evidence 
for DOJ.
Request SEC to conduct 
investigation solely to 
obtain evidence of DOJ.
Lies that there is no 
pending criminal 
investigation.
Manipulate SEC’s
deposition by designating 
location and deciding 
what to ask or not to ask.
Unlikely 
Bad Faith
Closely cooperate with 
DOJ, having regular 
meetings and receiving 
instructions, but make its 
own decisions what to do.
Request SEC to conceal 
DOJ’s involvement or 
pending criminal 
investigation.
State that it is SEC’s
policy not to tell whether 
there is pending criminal 
investigation.
Hold off criminal 
investigation due to SEC’s
investigation.
Warn that information 
may be used in criminal 
investigation using a 
standard form. 
In practice, both the DOJ and the SEC take note of Stringer and 
Scrushy. For example, Attorney General of the DOJ stated that 
“[d]epartment attorneys should be mindful of arguments like those raised 
in [Stringer and Scrushy] that civil, administrative, or regulatory 
proceedings are being used improperly to further a criminal 
investigation.”222
The SEC also instructs its investigators to keep, among others, the 
following considerations in mind when conducting a parallel 
investigation: (1) the civil investigation should not be initiated to obtain 
evidence for a criminal prosecution; (2) “the staff should make its own 
independent decision about what documents to request . . . [and] what 
222. Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 177, at n.1. 
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questions to ask”; and (3) if asked “whether there is a parallel criminal 
investigation, staff should direct . . . to the section of Form 1662 dealing 
with ‘Routine Uses of Information,’ and state that it is the general policy 
of the Commission not to comment on criminal investigations.”223 The 
SEC further notes that sharing information with criminal prosecutors is 
generally permissible even if the sharing is intended to, and does in fact, 
assist criminal investigations.224
In response to a question asking how far the SEC can go in 
recommending a course of action to the DOJ, a former director of the 
Division of Enforcement of the SEC stated that not telling defendants 
about pending criminal investigations might be unfair:
The answer is not very far. And it implicates the Stringer and Scrushy
line of cases where, in the context of a pending civil settlement, if the 
staff is aware that there is criminal interest in a particular defendant’s 
conduct, then there is potential for unfairness to that defendant if the staff 
proceeds with recommending a settlement to the Commission, where the 
defendant does not know of that criminal interest. Because defendants 
would theoretically want to resolve their differences with the 
government all at the same time, and not resolve [those differences] with 
the SEC if they know that there is a criminal interest pending . . . . [I]n 
most instances the defendants that end up getting sued do not learn about 
the SEC’s investigation until the day they are being arrested.225
The current practice of the SEC and the DOJ is subject to criticism by 
scholars and practitioners. For example, Persaud warns of the danger of 
parallel proceedings where criminal law enforcement could use 
administrative investigations to circumvent due process.226 Persaud points 
out that there is still no clear guideline in the Administrative Procedure 
Act or case law as to the circumstances under which, and to what extent, 
administrative and criminal agencies could exchange information.227
223. SEC MANUAL, supra note 94, § 5.2.1.
224. Id.
225. Symposium, Panel: The SEC’s Perspective, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 519, 
524 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
226. Persaud, supra note 99, at 78.
227. Id. at 79; see also SIFFERT & RAKOFF, supra note 70, at ¶ 2.04(2)(a) (“[I]t also 
requires a case by case approach in order to measure good faith and whether the good faith 
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Persaud criticizes the courts’ reasoning on the ground that there seems 
to be a presumption of good faith, and affected parties must provide clear 
evidence of bad faith, which involves a highly challenging task to prove 
“that the sole purpose of the administrative investigation action was to 
assist the parallel criminal proceeding.”228 He proposes that the judicial 
and legislative branches should redress the imbalance, particularly in 
relation to the privilege of self-incrimination and burden of proof, but he 
does not provide how they should redress the imbalance.229
Similarly, Sulzbach and Clare point out the risk that government 
agencies may use parallel investigations more aggressively and 
frequently.230 They observe that Stringer231 demonstrates how 
administrative or civil proceedings could be used as an excuse for a 
parallel criminal proceeding where prosecutors may obtain incriminating 
evidence, including “material unknowingly provided by a defendant that 
would otherwise be inaccessible.”232 They also argue that, under the 
analysis of Stringer, the government can cure violations of constitutional 
rights and “cleanse what otherwise might be considered deceitful 
government conduct,” merely using a form with boilerplate language.233
Even though the judiciary has endorsed the government’s potentially 
questionable tactics,234 there would still be two remaining limits.235 First, 
a civil or administrative investigation may not be a sham designed solely 
for a prosecutor to obtain evidence for a criminal proceeding.236 Second, 
the agencies may be silent, refuse to answer, or provide ambiguous 
requirement was violated when a summons was issued solely for criminal investigatory 
purposes before criminal proceedings were instituted.”). 
228. Persaud, supra note 99, at 96.
229. Id. at 109.
230. Sulzbach & Clare, supra note 179, at 23.
231. United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
SEC’s standard form adequately warned the defendants that evidence could be used in 
criminal proceedings).
232. Sulzbach & Clare, supra note 179, at 24.
233. Id.
234. See Persaud, supra note 99, at 93 (“Yet the judicial branch, thus far, has been 
reluctant to interfere where the good faith standard has been met.”).
235. Sulzbach & Clare, supra note 179, at 25, 27. Sulzbach recommends clients to 
seek stays in a civil or administrative proceeding so they can invoke the Fifth Amendment 
in a criminal case but later testify in the civil matter. Id. at 27.
236. Id. at 25. 
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answers, but not actually lie about a pending criminal investigation.237
Sulzbach and Clare point out that even though one case seems to allow the 
government to lie, the case was exceptional because the government had 
a search warrant.238
I agree with the argument above that the parallel proceedings may pose 
a significant risk of infringing individuals’ constitutional rights and may 
be unfair to the defendant who might have changed conduct if he had 
known that there was a pending criminal investigation. However, I do not 
believe the guideline under case law is unclear. As Sulzbach and Clare 
pointed out, and I summarized above, there is a clear line when the 
government conduct becomes “bad faith.” Under the current U.S. case 
law, the criminal investigators may not use evidence collected through 
administrative investigations if the criminal investigators (1) use 
administrative investigations as a “sham” (i.e., using solely to obtain 
evidence for criminal proceedings); (2) let administrative investigators 
affirmatively lie or make misleading statement to conceal the existence of 
criminal investigations if asked whether there is a parallel criminal 
investigation; or (3) manipulate administrative investigations by deciding 
what to do and not to do. 
B.Other Countries
As discussed above, the SEC needs a search warrant to forcibly inspect 
an individual or company, and the privilege against self-incrimination is 
available throughout SEC investigations as long as there is a reasonable 
basis for believing that an answer to the question is incriminating.239 I, 
however, could not find any comprehensive research that compares how 
domestic laws of other jurisdictions protect constitutional rights in parallel 
proceedings. Therefore, I will compare administrative powers of securities 
regulators, including authority to impose substantial monetary penalties 
and the use of information in criminal proceedings in the United States 
with those in six jurisdictions, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
237. Id.; see also SIFFERT & RAKOFF, supra note 76, at ¶ 2.04(1)(a) (“When the 
subject of the investigation is deceived into believing that the proceeding is purely civil in 
nature, the evidence obtained by the government may be suppressed at the criminal 
proceeding on Fourth or Fifth Amendment grounds.”).
238. Sulzbach & Clare, supra note 179, at 25.
239. See supra II.A.1.c.
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1. Australia
An administrative securities regulator in Australia, the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (“ASIC”) may refer a case to the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions if it believes that it has 
“gathered sufficient evidence to support the view that a criminal offence 
has been committed.”240
Section 35 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 2001 (“ASIC Act”) provides that, if a person does not voluntarily 
produce a document, then the ASIC, with the assistance of the police, may 
conduct searches and seizures under a search warrant.241 A magistrate may 
issue a search warrant if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
to suspect that there are documents on particular premises, whose 
production could not be required otherwise.242
The ASIC Act provides that “it is not a reasonable excuse for a person 
to refuse or fail: (a) to give information; or (b) to sign a record; or (c) to 
produce a book . . . [that it] might tend to incriminate the person or make 
the person liable to a penalty.”243 It further provides that if the person 
240. INFORMATION SHEET 151: ASIC’S APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT, 5 (AUSTL.
SEC. AND INFO. COMM’N).
241. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) pt 3 div 3 ss
35 & 36 (Austl.) [hereinafter ASIC Act].
242. Id. s 36(1). Note that the standard is substantially similar to the one required 
for a criminal search warrant, which requires showing of reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that there is, or there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the 
premises. Crimes Act 1914 p 1AA d 2 s 3E(1) (Austl.).
243. ASIC Act, supra note 241, s 68(1). In Australia, the self-incrimination privilege 
is considered “testimonial in nature,” and does not cover evidence that is “non-testimonial 
in nature,” such as fingerprints and DNA samples. Australian Law Reform Commission,
Traditional Rights and Freedoms—Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, in ALRC
INTERIM REPORT 127 at p. 340–41 (2015) [hereinafter ALRC REPORT]. The ALRC Report 
quotes the following language from Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281:
The privilege prohibits the compulsion of the witness to give testimony, but it does not 
prohibit the giving of evidence, against the will of a witness, as to the condition of his body. 
For example, the witness may be required to provide a fingerprint, or to show his face or 
some other part of his body so that he may be identified.
Id. at 341. Whether documents are non-testimonial in nature is not clear, but the ASIC 
points out that “in three judgments of the High Court, documents have been referred to as 
‘in the nature of real evidence which speak for themselves’, in contrast to testimonial 
evidence, with the inference that the privilege may be unnecessary with regard to 
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claims in advance that the statement or signing of a record might 
incriminate him, the evidence is not admissible against the person in a 
criminal proceeding or a proceeding to impose a penalty.244
ASIC may file a civil claim in court against persons who committed 
market misconduct to seek remedies including orders of disqualification, 
disgorgement, and monetary penalties up to $200,000.245
In Australia, it is not clear whether and how various evidentiary and 
procedural protections in criminal proceedings, such as the highest burden 
of proof of beyond reasonable doubt and the self-incrimination privilege, 
are accorded in civil penalty proceedings.246 Lees observes that the hybrid 
nature of civil penalties makes it difficult to come up with a clear guideline 
because the civil character supports the expediency, and the quasi-criminal 
character supports greater judicial oversight.247
In 2002, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended the 
enactment of the “Regulatory Contraventions Statute” to cover various 
aspects of the law and procedure governing civil penalty proceedings.248
Lees, however, observes that the legislature has not implemented the 
recommendation and whether procedural protections apply in civil penalty 
proceedings has been decided by courts on an ad hoc case-by-case basis.249
For example, a court held that a person should not be ordered to make a 
discovery in contravention of the “privilege against exposure to penalties,” 
which is substantially similar to the self-incrimination privilege, when the 
Australian securities regulator sought a disqualification order against the 
person in a civil proceeding.250 Similarly, a court held that the penalty 
documents.” Id. The ALRC Report, however, notes that in those cases it was not necessary 
for the court to decide whether the privilege would cover documents. Id.
244. ASIC Act, supra note 241, s 68(3). Although the ASIC enters into a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
regarding sharing of information, it is silent as to how to deal with self-incriminating 
evidence. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (AUSTL. SEC. AND INFO. COMM’N AND 
DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS).
245. ASIC’S APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT, supra note 240, at 5.
246. Matthew Lees, Civil Penalties and Procedural Protections, 87 AUSTL. L.J. 404, 
405 (2013).
247. Id. at 424. 
248. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION (ALRC), PRINCIPLED REGULATION:
FEDERAL CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES 263 (2002).
249. Lees, supra note 246, at 406.
250. Id. at 414 (citing Rich v Austl Sec & Inv Comm’n (2004) 220 CLR 129 (Austl.)). 
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privilege applies in a proceeding in which the Australian securities 
regulator sought a civil penalty.251
2. Canada
In Canada, provincial securities regulators will often collaborate with 
other law-enforcement agencies in criminal investigations.252 Under 
Section 13(4) of the Ontario Securities Act, investigators of the Ontario 
Securities Commission may conduct searches and seizures under a search 
warrant.253 A judge of the Ontario Court of Justice may issue a warrant if 
he is satisfied that “there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that there may be in the building, receptacle, or place to be searched 
anything that may reasonably relate to the [investigation.]”254
Section 11(c) of the Charter provides: “Any person charged with an 
offence has the right . . . not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings 
against that person in respect of the offence.”255 Section 11(c) “does not 
protect a witness compelled to give evidence in a securities regulatory 
investigation or an administrative proceeding because the individual is not 
‘charged with an offense.’”256 Section 13 of the Charter, however, provides 
that such a witness “has the right not to have any incriminating evidence 
so given used to incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except 
in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence.”257
251. Lees, supra note 246, at 414–15 (citing Austl Sec & Inv Comm’n v Mining 
Project Grp Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 32 (Austl.)).
252. Canada in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH at 1.
253. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, § 13(4) (Can.).
254. Id. § 13(5). Note that the standard is substantially similar to that required for 
criminal search warrant in Canada, which is to ask whether reasonable and probable 
grounds have been established that a crime has been committed and the search will reveal 
evidence of the offense. See infra Appendix A.2.
255. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 13 (U.K.). 
256. Glen Jennings et al., Preventing Self-Incrimination in Cross-Border 
Investigations, LEXOLOGY (May 26, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=50573336-55f8-4d3a-92f2-
ee938950bdb5.
257. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, c 13 (U.K.). 
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The Ontario Securities Commission may impose two monetary 
sanctions: administrative penalties and disgorgement.258 An administrative 
monetary penalty can be up to $1 million for each failure to comply, 
depending on the circumstances.259 “Disgorgement orders require the 
respondent to pay the amount obtained as a result of the non-compliance 
with securities law.”260 The Ontario Securities Commission may “consider 
a respondent’s ability to pay as a factor in imposing financial sanctions,” 
but in practice, it imposes monetary sanctions irrespective of the 
availability of assets to deter others from contravening the Securities 
Act.261
In Canada, the rights guaranteed by Section 11 of the Charter are 
“available to persons prosecuted by the State for public offences involving 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
either federally or provincially enacted . . . to provide procedural 
safeguards in proceedings which may attract penal consequences even if 
not criminal in the strict sense.”262 The Supreme Court ruled that “[a] 
matter could fall within s. 11 either because by its very nature it is a 
criminal proceeding or because a conviction in respect of the offence may 
lead to a true penal consequence.”263
3. Hong Kong
A securities regulator in Hong Kong, the Securities and Futures 
Commission (the “SFC”) has a wide range of enforcement powers, not 
258. OSC, Sanctions by the Commission (2019) 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/Proceedings_sanctions-commission_index.htm.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, 542 (Can.).
263. Id. Although I could not find any case dealing with securities regulators’ civil 
penalty proceedings, there is one case in which a tax court found that the rights guaranteed 
by section 11 of the Charter are available in a civil monetary penalty proceeding against a 
person who knowingly makes or participates in the making of a false statement on an 
income tax return. Amanda J. Stacey, Tax Court of Canada Decides Third-Party Civil 
Penalty Assessments Come With Charter Protections, SOCIAL IMPACT NEWSLETTER, Dec. 
2012. The tax court found that the matter is penal in nature because the civil monetary
penalties have a broad purpose of promoting public order and protecting the public at large. 
Id.
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only regulatory and civil,264 but also criminal.265 Under Section 191 of the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance (the “SFO”), investigators of the SFC 
may conduct searches and seizures under a search warrant.266 A magistrate 
may issue a search warrant if he is satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that there is, or there is likely to be, any record or 
document which may be required to be produced on premises specified in 
the information.267
Under Section 183 of the SFO, a person under investigation by the SFC 
must produce any record or document specified by the investigator and 
answer any question relating to the matters under investigation.268 A
person is not excused from complying with a requirement only on the 
ground that to do so might tend to incriminate the person, and a person 
who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with the requirement may 
be subject to a fine or imprisonment.269 Any compelled statement, 
however, may not be admissible in evidence against the person in criminal 
proceedings in Hong Kong.270
The SFC may file a civil complaint against a person who committed 
market misconduct in the Market Misconduct Tribunal with the consent of 
the Secretary for Justice.271 The Market Misconduct Tribunal may order 
the person to pay an amount equal to ill-gotten gains plus the costs and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the SFC.272
Section 65(1) of the Evidence Ordinance explicitly provides that the 
self-incrimination privilege is available “only as [it] regards criminal 
offences under the law of Hong Kong and penalties provided for by such 
264. Securities and Futures Commission, Enforcement Philosophy (Mar. 5, 2013)
http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/regulatory-functions/enforcement/enforcement-
philosophy.html (H.K.)
265. Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance, No. 5, (2002) O.H.K. § 388 
(explaining the SFC can bring criminal proceedings in the Magistrate Court).
266. Id. § 191.
267. Id. Note that the standard is substantially similar to the one required for a 
criminal search warrant, which requires reasonable cause to believe that an offence has 
been or is about to be committed. Hong Kong Crimes Ordinance, (1972) Cap. 200, § 13 
(H.K.).
268. Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance, No. 5, (2002) O.H.K. § 183.
269. Id. § 184.
270. Id. § 187.
271. Id. § 252.
272. Id. § 257(1).
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law.”273 The self-incrimination privilege, therefore, does not seem to be 
available in SFC proceedings to seek orders to pay disgorgement and the 
cost and expenses.  
4. Japan
The Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (“JSESC”) can 
conduct an administrative investigation to seek an administrative 
monetary penalty or file a criminal charge with the public prosecutor’s 
office.274 Under Article 177 of the Financial Instruments and Exchange 
Act ( “FIEA”), on a voluntary basis, investigators of the JSESC may 
question or ask for the submission of documents from persons concerned 
with a case or witnesses, as well as enter into the premises of the person 
and inspect documents without a search warrant.275 Although there is no 
statutory or case law specifically referring to the constitutionality of the 
power above, administrative warrantless searches are generally allowed,276
and administrative interrogation under the tax law is considered not a 
compelling self-incriminatory statement.277
Japan takes a similar position to U.S. case law as to the use of 
information in criminal proceedings. In relation to an administrative tax 
investigation, the Supreme Court held that the power to conduct an 
interview and ask for the production of documents by administrative tax 
regulators may not be used solely for collecting evidence for a criminal 
proceeding.278 The Supreme Court, however, noted that the mere 
possibility that the collected evidence may be used in a criminal 
proceeding at a later stage would not make the administrative investigation 
illegal.279 Although there is no case on securities administrative 
investigations, the evidence collected by the JSESC may arguably be used 
273. Hong Kong Evidence Ordinance, (1889) Cap. 8, § 65(1) (H.K.). Note that this 
provision is identical to section 14(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 of the United 
Kingdom. Civil Evidence Act 1968, c. 64 (Eng.). See infra Section II.B.6. 
274. JSESC, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSION’S
INITIATIVES—BUILDING ON A QUARTER-CENTURY OF ACHIEVEMENT 15, 16 (2017), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/all.pdf.
275. Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 177 (Japan).
276. YASUO HASEBE, CONSTITUTION 264–65 (3d ed. 2004). 
277. Id. at 265.
278. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 2004, 2003(A) no. 884 (Japan).
279. Id.
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in later criminal proceedings if the purpose of such investigation is not 
solely to collect evidence for criminal proceedings.
The administrative monetary penalty proceeding under the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act (“FIEA”) was introduced in 2004 as an 
administrative action to impose financial obligations on a violator for the 
purpose of deterring market misconduct.280 Under the FIEA, the financial 
obligations are considered equivalent to economic benefits gained by 
market misconduct.281 Pursuant to an amendment of the FEIA and relevant 
regulations in 2014 regarding the amount of administrative penalties, the 
administrative monetary penalty to be imposed on investment 
management business operators that engaged in market misconduct will 
be three times the amount of the investment management fee that such 
business operators receive or would have received for the month when the 
market misconduct occurred.282
5. Singapore
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (“MAS”) is an administrative 
securities regulator. Under Section 164 of the Securities and Futures Act 
(“SFA”), the MAS may conduct searches and seizures under a search 
warrant.283 A magistrate may issue a search warrant if, for example, he is 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the production is 
required and production is not made voluntarily.284
280. Memorandum from Working Group on Insider Trading Regulation on The 
Review of Insider Trading Regulation Following Recent Violations and Other 
Developments 8, (Dec. 25, 2012), 
https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/singie_kinyu/20121225/02.pdf [hereinafter
Working Group Memo].
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Law No. 25 of 1948, as 
amended, art. 175(1)(iii)(a); Article 1-21(2) of Cabinet Office Ordinance on 
Administrative Monetary Penalty Provided for in Chapter VI-II of the FIEA (examples of 
the new provisions added by the Amendments).
283. Securities and Futures Act Ch. 289 § 164 (Sing.).
284. Id. Note that the standard is substantially similar to the one required for a 
criminal search warrant, which requires showing of reason for the court to believe that a 
person would not otherwise produce the document or other thing. Criminal Justice Reform 
Act § 24(a) (Sing.).
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Under Section 143 of the SFA, where the MAS considers that a person 
may have conducted market misconduct, the MAS may require the person 
to disclose the information that the person has about that matter.285 The 
person is not excused from disclosing information on the ground that the 
disclosure of the information might tend to incriminate him, but if the 
person claims as such in advance, any statement may not be admissible in 
evidence against him in criminal proceedings.286
The MAS and the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”) have 
conducted joint criminal and civil investigations since March 2015.287
Previously the MAS would pursue civil penalty actions, and the CAD 
would pursue criminal investigations, but with the joint investigations, the 
MAS and the CAD now can both investigate all potential market 
misconduct and make a decision whether a case is subject to criminal or 
civil proceedings when investigations have concluded.288
Under the arrangement, the MAS and the CAD can consolidate their 
securities fraud investigative resources and expertise, such as the MAS’s 
insights in supervising the financial sector and the CAD’s investigative 
and enforcement functions.289 Under this scheme, MAS officers are given 
the same criminal powers of investigation as CAD officers, including the 
ability to search premises and seize items.290 Because under the Criminal 
Procedure Code the person examined by criminal investigators have the 
self-incrimination privilege,291 MAS officers engaging in joint 
investigations will not have the power to compel self-incrimination 
statements. 
The MAS may, with the consent of the Public Prosecutor, bring an 
action in a court against a person who conducted market misconduct to 
seek an order for a civil penalty of an amount equal to the greater of (1) 
285. Securities and Futures Act Ch. 289 § 143 (Sing.).
286. Id. § 145.
287. MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, Capital Markets Enforcement 8 (Jan. 
2016), https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/News-and-Publications/Monographs-and-
Information-Papers/MAS-Capital-Markets-Enforcement.pdf.
288. Id. at 8.
289. Id. at 9. 
290. MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, MAS and CAD to Jointly Investigate 
Market Misconduct Offences, (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-
releases/2015/mas-and-cad-to-jointly-investigate-market-misconduct-offences.
291. Criminal Procedure Code § 22(2) (Sing.).
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three times of the profit gained or loss avoided, or (2) $50,000 for a natural 
person or $100,000 for a corporation.292
6. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has 
a wide range of enforcement powers, not only regulatory and civil, but also 
criminal.293 Investigator of the FCA may conduct searches and seizures 
under a search warrant.294 A justice of peace may issue a search warrant if, 
for example, he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the subject did not voluntarily comply with the FCA’s request and 
information or documents required are on the premises.295
The FCA can also require any person to attend an interview, provide 
information, and produce documents.296 If the person is the subject of the 
investigation, the information sought need only be “relevant to the 
purposes of the investigation.”297 However, if the person in question is not 
“connected” with the person under investigation, the FCA must be 
satisfied that the information sought is “necessary or expedient for the 
purposes of the investigation.”298 Failure to comply with the FCA’s order 
is “treated as a contempt of court . . . unless the individual can show that 
he had a reasonable excuse for his failure to comply.”299 The individual 
has no right to silence, but his compelled statement may not be used in any 
criminal proceedings in which he is the accused.300
292. Id. §§ 232(1), (2). I could not find any law in Singapore on the question of 
whether the self-incrimination privilege applies to civil penalty proceedings.
293. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, Enforcement (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/about/enforcement.
294. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, § 176 (UK).
295. Id. § 176(1)(2). Note that the standard is substantially similar to the one 
required for a criminal search warrant, which is requires reasonable grounds for believing 
that, among others, an indictable offence has been committed, there is material on premises, 
which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation, and the material is likely to 
be relevant evidence. See infra Appendix A.13. 
296. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, §§ 171–72 (UK).
297. Id. § 171.
298. Id. § 172.
299. Elly Proudlock & David Rundle, FCA Powers Used at the Request of Overseas 
Regulators: A Practical Summary, WILMERHALE UK, (Jan. 25, 2016).
300. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, § 174(2) (UK).
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The FCA may impose a fine based on two elements, “disgorgement of 
the benefit received as a result of the breach” and “a financial penalty 
reflecting the seriousness of the breach.”301 A fine is calculated based on 
the following five-step framework: 
(1) the removal of any financial benefit derived directly from the breach;
(2) the determination of a figure which reflects the seriousness of the 
breach; (3) an adjustment made to the Step 2 figure to take account of 
any aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (4) an upwards 
adjustment made to the amount arrived at after Steps 2 and 3, where 
appropriate, to ensure that the penalty has an appropriate deterrent effect; 
and (5) if applicable, a settlement discount will be applied. This 
discount does not apply to disgorgement of any financial benefit derived 
directly from the breach.302
Section 14(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 explicitly provides that 
the self-incrimination privilege is available only “as regards criminal 
offences under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and penalties 
provided for by such law.”303 The self-incrimination privilege, therefore, 
does not seem to be available in FCA proceedings to impose a fine.
C. Summary
Here, I will compare and summarize the laws of seven jurisdictions to 
show to what extent and under what circumstances evidence obtained in 
administrative investigations may be used in subsequent criminal
proceedings. 
Of the seven jurisdictions described above, five jurisdictions (Australia, 
Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United Kingdom) require a search 
warrant by a judge for administrative securities regulators to conduct 
searches and seizures.304 In those jurisdictions, the judge acts as a 
gatekeeper and will not issue a search warrant if he does not believe there 
is a reasonable basis for conducting searches and seizures, which is a 
standard substantially similar to the one required for a criminal search 
301. FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY, DECISION PROCEDURE AND PENALTIES 
MANUAL, § 6.5.3 (2012)
302. Id. § 6.5A.
303. Civil Evidence Act 1968 § 14(1) (UK).
304. See supra Section II.B.
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warrant.305 In the United States, the SEC may require regulated persons to 
produce documents and issue subpoenas to obtain documents and 
information from non-regulated persons.306 The SEC also conducts 
“informal” investigations in which the SEC requests production of 
documents and other information and conducts interviews on a voluntary 
basis.307 In Japan, a search warrant is not required because administrative 
searches and seizures are only conducted on a voluntary basis with the 
consent of the persons subject to the investigation.308
In principle, there are three approaches to the problem of the use in 
criminal proceedings of self-incrimination evidence compelled by 
administrative regulators. First, in five jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United Kingdom), the law puts the 
individual under an unlimited duty to disclose relevant information in 
administrative investigations, but prohibits the use of compelled evidence 
in criminal proceedings if it is self-incriminatory.309 Second, in the United 
States, the self-incrimination privilege is considered available throughout 
SEC investigations and enforcement actions as long as there is a 
reasonable basis for believing that an answer is incriminating, although the 
privilege may not be invoked to refuse production of documents required 
to be kept by law.310 In addition, the SEC may not share documents and 
information with the DOJ if the SEC or DOJ acts in bad faith, such as 
affirmatively lying about the existence of criminal proceedings or
conducting an administrative interview solely to obtain evidence for 
criminal investigations.311 Third, in Japan, the self-incrimination privilege 
is not available in administrative investigations because the investigations 
are conducted on a voluntary basis.312 The securities regulators in Japan, 
however, may not share documents and information with criminal 
305. See supra Section II.B.
306. See supra Section II.A.1.
307. See supra Section II.A.1.
308. See supra Section II.B.4. As the SEC does in informal investigations and the 
Japanese securities regulator conducts searches and seizures on a voluntary basis, 
regulators in other jurisdictions may rely on warrantless searches and seizures based on 
consent. 
309. See supra Section II.B.
310. See supra Section II.A.1.
311. See supra Section II.A.3.
312. See supra Section II.B.4.
2019] Information Exchange Between Securities Regulators 89
investigators if an administrative investigation is conducted solely for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in criminal proceedings.313
In contrast to the prohibition on the use of compelled self-incriminatory 
evidence in criminal proceedings provided in the laws of all jurisdictions, 
no jurisdiction has a law explicitly prohibiting the use in criminal 
proceedings of evidence “unreasonably” obtained by administrative 
investigators.314 The difference exists probably because of three reasons. 
First, because the securities regulators may “reasonably” obtain 
documents and information either by just requesting production to 
regulated entities, asking consent to produce on a voluntary basis, or 
obtaining an administrative search warrant, the law does not need to 
provide for “unreasonable” searches and seizures. Second, there is 
sufficient ex-ante protection by the search warrant requirement, while 
there is less ex-ante protection against self-incriminatory statements that 
administrative regulators may have compelled. Administrative 
investigators are generally required to obtain a search warrant or consent 
of a person subject to the investigation. In contrast, although a person may 
refuse to answer a question on the grounds that his answer might 
incriminate him, the self-incrimination privilege can be often invoked only 
after the fact. Third, in five jurisdictions (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and the United Kingdom), the requirement for the issuance of 
an administrative search warrant is substantially similar to the one required 
for a criminal search warrant315, so there is no practical reason to have 
additional protection. In the United States and Japan, case law prohibits 
administrative investigators from conducting an administrative search 
solely for obtaining evidence to be used in criminal proceedings.316 This 
difference between protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
and self-incrimination also affects the law in connection with cross-border 
information exchange, as I will discuss in the next section. 
In all six jurisdictions, but Hong Kong, securities regulators may seek 
civil or administrative monetary penalties, the amount of which are more 
than just disgorgement.317 For example, in the United Kingdom, the FCA 
may impose a fine based on not only disgorgement but also a financial 
313. See supra Section II.B.4.
314. See supra Sections II.A, II B.
315. See supra Section II.B.
316. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.4.
317. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
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penalty reflecting the seriousness of the breach.318 In Hong Kong, the SFC 
may file a civil complaint with a court, but the remedy is limited to 
disgorgement and the costs and expenses.319
Law of the seven jurisdictions are divided on the question of whether 
the self-incrimination privilege is available in securities regulators’ civil 
or administrative monetary penalty proceedings. In Australia and the 
United States, the self-incrimination privilege is available in civil penalty 
proceedings.320 In contrast, in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, the 
identical provisions of evidence statutes explicitly provide that the self-
incrimination privilege is available only in criminal proceedings.321 In 
Japan, there is no case or statutory law on the question because the 
securities regulator has no authority to compel self-incriminatory 
information.322 Laws in Canada and Singapore are not clear on this 
question. 
Finally, under what circumstances should evidence obtained in 
administrative investigations be admissible in subsequent criminal 
proceedings? Laws of Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the 
United Kingdom have a bright-line rule under which compelled self-
incriminating evidence by securities regulators is not admissible in 
criminal proceedings.323 In contrast, in the United States and Japan, the 
courts will prohibit such use of evidence only if an administrative 
investigation is conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence to 
be used in criminal proceedings or otherwise is used in bad faith by 
criminal authorities.324 Both rules make sense because the rationale behind 
such inadmissibility is obviously to prevent criminal authorities from 
circumventing protections available in criminal proceedings by using an 
administrative investigation as a sham. At the same time, the rule should 
encourage timely communication, coordination, and cooperation between 
administrative and criminal authorities in good faith to conduct 
investigation efficiently and choose appropriate remedies depending on 
the circumstances to the extent that there is no infringement of 
constitutional protection available to the subject of investigation and no 
318. See supra Section II.B.6.
319. See supra Section II.B.3.
320. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.1.
321. See supra Sections II.B.3, II.B.6.
322. See supra Section II.B.4. 
323. See supra Section II.B.
324. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.4.
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unfair burdening on the subject. The rule completely prohibiting the use 
of any evidence obtained through administrative investigations in criminal 
proceedings would also discourage securities regulators from utilizing or 
introducing administrative enforcement tools. In the next section, I will 
examine this issue in the international settings. 
III. CROSS-BORDER INFORMATION EXCHANGE BETWEEN SECURITIES 
REGULATORS
Parallel proceedings between regulators of two countries are not 
unusual in cross-border cases today.325 This section focuses on cases in 
which a securities regulator in one jurisdiction may be prevented from 
obtaining information from a securities regulator in another jurisdiction 
because of constitutional protections.  
“Historically many of the SEC’s [market misconduct] cases were 
simply the outgrowth of cases that were primarily domestic in nature.”326
Today, cases have increasingly involved significant overseas conduct, in 
many of which the jurisdictional nexus between the suspicious conduct 
and the U.S. market was not necessarily strong.327 The SEC has been 
generally successful in forging cooperative relationships with many 
foreign regulators, whether in the context of parallel investigations or 
simply through the production of information and documents by foreign 
regulators.328However, because the SEC’s administrative enforcement 
may involve the imposition of civil penalties,329 it could be construed as 
“quasi-criminal” proceedings and prevent cross-border information 
exchange.
The introduction of administrative enforcement would allow securities 
regulators to have more flexibility and efficiency in their enforcement. 
Introduction of administrative enforcement, however, may also bring 
additional risks that require attention and cooperation among securities 
regulators. Because even if a sanction is labeled as “administrative” under 
domestic laws, it could hinder information exchange with regulators that 
325. Michael Feldberg, U.S. Insider Trading Enforcement Goes Global, HARVARD 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN REG. at 1 (May 26, 2013).
326. See id. at 1 (discussing the trend of insider trading cases).
327. See id.
328. Id. at 4.
329. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 88, at 7–8.
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construe it as a “quasi-criminal” sanction, even raising international 
double jeopardy concerns.
Recall the hypothetical case presented at the beginning of this article. 
There, we assumed that an investor residing in one country, where 
securities regulator X oversees the market, commits market manipulation 
or insider trading in another country where securities regulator Y oversees 
the market. Further, assume that Y may seek either administrative 
monetary penalties to make the investor disgorge ill-gotten gains or 
criminal penalties. Can Y use in its administrative “penalty” proceedings 
the documents and information that X collected through an administrative 
investigation when the similar use in X’s country would violate the 
constitutional or statutory protections in X’s country? Also, can Y use in 
its criminal proceedings the documents and information that X collected 
using methods that, if conducted by Y in Y’s country, would violate 
constitutional protections in Y’s country?
In this section, I will first examine how criminal authorities conduct 
cross-border information exchange, then compare domestic laws
restricting cross-border information exchange between administrative 
regulators to highlight issues in the use of self-incriminating evidence, and 
finally propose solutions.
A. Between Criminal Authorities
1. Methods
There are generally three formal methods for a criminal investigator to 
obtain information from foreign jurisdictions: letters rogatory, treaty 
requests, and requests under executive agreements.330 Letters rogatory are 
generally used “in the absence of a treaty or executive agreement.”331 “A 
letter rogatory is a request from a judge in [one country] to the judiciary 
of another country requesting the performance of an act,” such as taking 
330. See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 274 
[hereinafter ATTORNEY’S MANUAL].  There are also other methods such as ad hoc methods 
to secure assistance and subpoenas. Id.
331. Id. § 275.
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depositions.332 “Letters rogatory are customarily transmitted via the 
diplomatic channel,” which may take a year or more.333
Criminal regulators often enter into treaties called Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (“MLATs”) to provide mutual assistance in criminal 
proceedings.334 An MLAT is a powerful tool because, as a treaty, it has a
binding authority, and it allows various types of assistance.335 The DOJ 
maintains MLATs with a number of countries.336 The SEC also may use it 
to obtain assistance in criminal investigation of securities violations, but it 
must ask the DOJ to assume the requesting process because the MLATs 
generally require that the request come through an official channel called 
a “Central Authority” (in case of the United States, the Attorney General 
or his/her designee).337
“Interim executive agreements of one form or another [may be] in 
force,” but “[m]ost apply to investigations arising from illegal narcotics 
trafficking.”338 Some require the attorney general of a requesting country 
to certify to the attorney general of the requested country that specified 
records are required in connection with a pending investigation of criminal 
conduct that is covered by the agreement.339
2. Admissibility in the United States of Evidence 
Unconstitutionally Obtained in Foreign Countries
As discussed in Section I above, most countries have similar rules to 
protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-
incrimination, but there are slight differences in such rules. Therefore, 
evidence obtained by the requested country under its domestic law may 
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Junsun Park, Enforcement of Securities Law in the Global Marketplace: Cross-
Border Cooperation in the Prosecution of Transnational Hedge Fund Fraud, 39 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 231, 254 (2014).
335. See, e.g., The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Japan, Japan-U.S., S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 108–12, Aug. 5, 2003 (stipulating that each contracting party shall, upon 
request by the other contracting party, provide mutual legal assistance in connection with 
investigations, prosecutions and other proceedings in criminal matters).
336. Park, supra note 334, at 254.
337. Id. at 255.
338. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 330, § 277.
339. Id.
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violate constitutional protections available in the requesting country. Here, 
I will examine U.S. case law on the admissibility of such evidence.
a. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
U.S. courts will likely allow the use of evidence unconstitutionally 
seized in foreign countries. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily does not 
apply to foreign authorities enforcing their own laws in their own territory, 
even if American officials are present and cooperate in some degree.340
Consequently, evidence obtained by foreign police officers from searches 
conducted in their own countries normally is admissible in U.S. courts, 
regardless of whether the search complies with the Fourth Amendment.341
There are, however, two exceptions: first, “if the conduct of the foreign 
officials during the search and seizure ‘shocks the judicial conscience,’ the 
evidence may be excluded;”342 second, “the exclusionary rule may be 
invoked if American law enforcement officials substantially participated 
in the search or if the foreign officials conducting the search were actually 
acting as agents for their American counterparts.”343
b. Self-Incrimination Privilege
340. United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 508–510 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 2568 (1995) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to search of 
American ship by Guatemalan officials even though the search was conducted at American 
request and American officials observed and videotaped it); see also United States v. Getto, 
729 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
search by Israeli officials if there is no American control, direction, or an intent to evade 
the Constitution).
341. Behety, 32 F.3d at 510. In terms of relationship between states and federal 
investigations, “silver platter doctrine” allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence 
illegally gathered by state police. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960). The 
Supreme Court, however, overturned the doctrine and held that evidence obtained by state 
officers during a search that, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated 
defendants’ immunity from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment 
was inadmissible. Id. at 223 (1960); see also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) 
(citing Elkins and criticizing the silver platter doctrine on the ground it imposed “more 
stringent limitations on federal officers than on state police acting independent of them.”).
342. Behety, 32 F.3d at 510. 
343. Id.
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The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of compelled testimony 
in American criminal proceedings applies even when a foreign sovereign 
has compelled the testimony.344 On the other hand, a U.S. witness may not 
assert the self-incrimination privilege if they could not demonstrate that 
testimony may be used in a criminal proceeding against the witness 
brought in the United States or one of the States, but only demonstrate that 
the witness feared the use in a criminal proceeding in a foreign country.345
When a witness has substantial exposure to a compelled testimony in a 
foreign sovereign, the government may not make use of the witness in 
criminal proceedings in the United States unless the government can prove 
that the witness’ review of the compelled testimony did not shape, alter, 
or affect the government case.346 In United States v. Allen, the defendants 
were charged with wire fraud in the United States but moved to suppress 
the testimony of a key witness, claiming that the witness’ testimony was 
based on statements of defendants that were compelled by the U.K. 
Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).347 The FCA’s interviews were 
compulsory but conducted on the condition that the testimony may not be 
used in criminal proceedings against the witness.348 In Kastigar v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that when the government compelled a 
self-incriminatory statement by conferring immunity, “the prosecution 
[has] the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is 
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled 
testimony.”349
344. United States v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States 
v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law is settled that statements taken 
by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary.”). 
345. Balsys, 524 U.S. 669, 669–72, (1998) (Holding that “concern with foreign 
prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”). Some argue that the 
U.S. courts should apply self-incrimination privilege not only in the domestic, but also the 
international context. Amann, supra note 67, at 1202; see also Note, Neal Modi, Toward 
an International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s 
“Compelled” to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961, 969 (arguing that U.S. courts 
should protect foreign-compelled testimony from use and derivative use to uphold the Fifth 
Amendment policies).
346. United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 63–68 (2d Cir. 2017).
347. Id. at 63, 66–68.   
348. Id. at 76.
349. 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972). 
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Relying on Kastigar, the Southern District of New York denied the 
motion and convicted the defendants, finding sufficient evidence that the 
witness was not exposed to the compelled testimony.350 The evidence 
included the facts that DOJ’s investigation team gave a presentation to the 
FCA on the Fifth Amendment and related cases “in order to explain the 
importance of maintaining a ‘wall’ between the two countries’ 
investigations,” and the DOJ asked the FCA not to share any information 
obtained by compelled interviews.351 On appeal, however, the Second 
Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction, finding that the government 
did not meet its burden because a key witness materially altered his 
testimony after being substantially exposed to defendants’ compelled 
testimony.352
B. Domestic Law Restriction on International Information 
Exchange Between Administrative Regulators 
This section will compare domestic laws of seven jurisdictions, which 
correspond to those compared in Section II (Domestic Information 
Exchange Between Administrative and Criminal Regulators), concerning 
cross-border information exchange between securities regulators to 
illustrate why a securities regulator may be prevented from obtaining 
information from a foreign securities regulator.  
1. Overview 
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters (“Hague Evidence Convention”) establishes a procedure whereby 
each contracting state designates a “Central Authority” to receive and 
review incoming “Letters of Request” for taking evidence in that 
country.353 Securities regulators today, however, rarely use the Convention 
350. Allen, 160 F. Supp. 3d 684, 694–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), rev’d, 864 F.3d 63 (2d 
Cir. 2017).
351. Id.
352. Allen, 864 F.3d at 97.  
353. Hague Conference on Private International Law Conference, Convention on 
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters art. 2, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 
U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
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as a tool to exchange information probably because the process is “unduly 
time consuming and expensive.”354
The IOSCO has established high standards of cross-border enforcement 
cooperation through the MMoU and should continue to do so through 
enhancement of the MMoU. The success of international cooperation 
agreements depends on two factors: (1) the degree to which they are 
utilized and improved;355 and (2) the degree to which domestic laws and 
courts support them.356 For this reason, many countries have established 
provisions authorizing their securities regulators to provide cross-border 
assistance.357 Some countries, however, try to restrict the use of self-
incriminatory evidence in criminal proceedings in other countries.358
Under the MMoU, a securities regulator may request other securities 
regulators to provide information and documents under the following 
354. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for S. 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987); see also Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence 
Convention Revisited: Reflections on Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 77, 98 (1994) (arguing that the Convention needs to improve to ensure the speedy 
execution).
355. See Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the 
Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 9 INT’L LAWYER 667, 696 (2005) (arguing 
that agreements are only statements of intent, so the practice of using them needs to be 
developed).
356. See id. at 687 (arguing that, even if there are bilateral or multilateral 
understandings among regulators, the ability to implement such understandings relies on 
whether regulators have the authority under the domestic laws).
357. See Securities Exchange Act § 21(a)(2) (2012) [hereinafter Exchange Act]; 
Federal Act on Stock Exchange and Securities Trading, Apr. 1, 2013, art. 38 (Switz.)
[hereinafter Stock Exchange Act]; Federal Act on the Financial Market Supervision Act, 
June 22, 2007, art. 42 (Switz.) [hereinafter Financial Market Supervision Act]; Ontario 
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 5 §§ 11(1)(b), 126, 143.10(1), 153 (Can.); Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000, §§ 169, 354 (UK); Securities and Futures Ordinance, 
(2012) Cap. 571, §186 (H.K.); Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act 
[Civil Act], Act. No. 8635, art. 437, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act. No. 12383 (S. Kor.)
[hereinafter Financial Investment Act].
358. As discussed later, no country explicitly restricts the use of evidence collected 
by unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal proceedings in other countries. 
See infra notes 364-66, 391 and accompanying text; KOKUSAI K?????T??NI KANSURU 
H?????? [Act on International Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters] 
(Japan).
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procedure.359 First, the requesting regulator must specify in writing, or 
orally in urgent circumstances, the facts underlying the investigation, the 
assistance sought, the relevant laws and regulations, and the use of non-
public information and documents provided by the requested regulator.360
Second, the requested regulator may refuse to assist for reasons including 
that the assistance would require the requested regulator to act in a manner 
that would violate its domestic law, that a criminal proceeding has already 
initiated in the jurisdiction of the requested regulator on the same facts and 
against the same person, and that the assistance would be against public 
interest or essential national interest.361 Third, the requesting regulator 
must obtain the consent of the requested regulator if the requesting 
regulator uses information and documents furnished for any purpose other 
than those stated in the original request.362
2. United States
The SEC may provide information and documents to foreign regulators 
without any restriction of the use in criminal proceedings. Section 21(a)(2) 
of the Securities Exchange Act provides as follows:
On request from a foreign securities authority, the Commission may 
provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph if the requesting 
authority states that the requesting authority is conducting an 
investigation which it deems necessary to determine whether any person 
has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any laws or rules relating 
to securities matters that the requesting authority administers or 
enforces.363
359. IOSCO, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU),
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=mmou.
360. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and 
Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, §§ 9, 10(a), May 2002, 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD386.pdf [hereinafter MMoU].
361. Id. § 6(e). The provision that allows the requested regulator to refuse to assist 
if a criminal proceeding has already initiated in the jurisdiction of the requested regulator 
on the same facts and against the same person is in the MMoU probably because of 
international double jeopardy concerns. Id.
362. Id. § 10(b).
363. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2017).
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The SEC may, in its discretion, “conduct investigations . . . to collect 
information and evidence pertinent to the request for assistance.”364 It is 
not necessary that the conduct subject to the investigation would also 
constitute a violation of the laws of the United States.365 “In deciding 
whether to provide such assistance, the [SEC] shall consider whether the 
requesting authority has agreed to provide reciprocal assistance . . . and 
[whether] compliance with the request would not prejudice the public 
interest of the United States.”366
3. Australia
Upon request from foreign securities regulators, the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (“ASIC”) may exercise 
compulsory powers to obtain “information, documents, or evidence” and 
transfer them to the foreign securities regulators under the Mutual 
Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 (“MABRA”).367 There are, 
however, some restrictions on such assistance under the MABRA, which 
364. Id.
365. Id. 
366. Id. The SEC, therefore, may refuse a request for assistance if such assistance 
prejudices the public interest of the United States. In the absence of explicit statutory 
language, however, it would be difficult for a subject of the investigation to seek injunction 
preventing the SEC from providing assistance, claiming that such assistance would violate 
constitutional protection available in the United States.
367. Art. 6 of Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 provides as 
follows:
6. Making of requests
(1) A foreign regulator, for purposes relating to the administration 
or enforcement of a foreign business law, may request a 
Commonwealth regulator to arrange for: (a) the obtaining from a 
person of information, documents or evidence specified in the 
request or relating to a matter specified in the request; and (b) 
transmitting such information, evidence or copies of such 
documents to the foreign regulator.
Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 pt 2 div 6 (Austl.) [hereinafter 
MABRA]; Australian Securities & Investments Commission, International Regulatory and 
Enforcement Cooperation, https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/what-we-do/international-
activities/international-regulatory-and-enforcement-cooperation/#main (explaining how 
ASIC cooperates with foreign regulators); AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT: THE TREASURY,
MAKING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT: AN AUSTRALIAN ASSESSMENT attachment I (1999) 
[hereinafter MAKING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT].
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may hinder international cooperation. A requesting country cannot use the 
“information or evidence” for criminal proceeding, or proceedings for the 
imposition of a penalty in the requesting country.368 Before providing 
assistance to the requesting country, the ASIC must obtain an undertaking 
from the requesting country to that effect and inform the Minister, who 
decides whether to authorize the request.369
Article 14 of the MABRA also specifically refers to the self-
incrimination privilege as follows: “The information or evidence, as the 
case may be, is not admissible in evidence against the person in: (a) a 
criminal proceeding; or (b) a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty; 
other than a proceeding in respect of the falsity of the information or 
evidence, as the case may be.”370? A proceeding “in respect of the falsity 
of the information or evidence” should mean a proceeding for perjury or 
contempt of court.371
368. Article 6(2) of the MABRA requires as follows:
6. (2) The Commonwealth regulator must not take action under 
section 7 in relation to the request unless the Commonwealth 
regulator has received in writing from the foreign regulator: (a) an 
undertaking by the foreign regulator to the effect that information 
or evidence obtained from the person and provided to the foreign 
regulator under this Act: (i) will not be used for the purposes of 
criminal proceedings against the person or of proceedings against 
the person for the imposition of a penalty; and (ii) to the extent to 
which it is within the ability of the foreign regulator to ensure it, 
will not be used by any other person, authority or agency for the 
purposes of any such proceedings.
MABRA, supra note 367, pt 2 s 6 sub-div 2.
369. Id. pt 2 ss 6–8.
370. Id. pt 2 s 14. Art. 15 of the MABRA also allows a lawyer to refuse to provide 
information or documents under the “legal professional privilege” if “(a) under this Act, a 
person requires a lawyer to give information or produce a document; and (b) giving the 
information or producing the document would involve disclosing a privileged 
communication made by, on behalf of, or to the lawyer in his or her capacity as a lawyer.”
Id. at pt 2 s 15 sub-div 1. See also STEPHANIE WEE & GHASSAN KASSISIEH, THE STRATEGIC 
VIEW – BUSINESS CRIME: AUSTRALIA (2016), https://www.strategicview.co.uk/strategic-
view/business-crime/the-strategic-view-business-crime-2016/australia (describing 
application of the privileges under the MABRA); MAKING TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENT,
supra note 367.
371. Section 128(7) of the Evidence Act 1995 provides that the self-incrimination 
privilege does not apply to a criminal proceeding “in respect of the falsity of the evidence.”
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The MABRA prohibits the use of “information and evidence” as 
evidence against the person who provided the information or evidence not 
only in criminal proceedings but also proceedings for the imposition of a 
“penalty.” “Penalty” in Australia is defined very broadly. The Australian 
Law Reform Commission explains as follows:
The term “penalty” is generally defined as a punishment, commonly in 
the form of the payment of a sum of money, although caselaw states that 
the word “is large enough to mean, is intended to mean, and does mean, 
any punishment, whether by imprisonment or otherwise.” Traditionally 
a “penalty” has been defined as a punishment meted out under the 
criminal law. Modern [definition] involves the idea of punishment, 
corporeal or pecuniary, or civil or criminal, although its meaning is 
generally confined to pecuniary punishment. Caselaw also suggests the 
term “penalty” may be used to denote a civil debt or imposition owed to 
the Crown or the state, as opposed to a “fine”, which denotes a criminal 
monetary penalty.372
The prohibition, therefore, may apply broadly to civil or administrative 
proceedings in other countries. For example, practitioners observe that the 
SEC cannot use the information and evidence obtained through the ASIC 
in SEC’s civil and administrative proceedings to impose civil penalties.373
4. Canada
Practitioners point out that because of the difference in self-
incrimination privilege between Canada and the United States, individuals 
with self-incriminating evidence who are subject to an examination 
request by a Canadian regulator have a risk that the compelled evidence 
may be shared with the DOJ without any notice.374
Ontario Securities Act (“OSA”) provides the Ontario Securities 
Commission (“OSC”) with the power to appoint persons to investigate 
This provision is construed to exclude a proceeding for perjury or contempt of court. 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, UNIFORM EVIDENCE LAW (2006) ¶ 15.136.  
372. 2003 ALRC Rep. 95, at 69 (Austl.).
373. Michael Mann, et al., International Agreements and Understandings for the 
Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 INT’L L. 780, 812 (1995).
374. Jennings, supra note 256, at 2.
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securities matter in two aspects.375 First, the OSC may investigate matters 
relating to “the due administration of Ontario securities law or the 
regulation of capital markets in Ontario” under section 11(1)(a) of the 
OSA.376 Second, the OSC may assist foreign securities regulators in the 
due administration of the securities laws or the regulation of the capital 
markets in another jurisdiction under Section 11(2)(b) of the OSA.377
The OSC’s investigatory power includes the right to question a person 
and compel the production of documents.378 The OSC also has the 
discretion to disclose compelled evidence to other regulatory bodies, 
including foreign regulators, without notice to the subject of the 
investigation if it deems “in the public interest.”379 The OSC is prohibited 
from disclosing the compelled evidence to criminal enforcement 
authorities in any country without the witness’ consent, but it is not 
prohibited from sharing it with administrative regulators, such as the SEC.
380 Therefore, it is possible that the compelled evidence may be shared with 
the SEC, which in turn may share it with the DOJ, without the witness’ 
consent or knowledge.381
In A v. Ontario Securities Commission, the applicant sought an order 
quashing a summons to witness issued by the OSC, arguing that there is a 
risk that his testimony may be used against him in criminal proceedings in 
the United States.382 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined to 
quash the summons, reasoning that there is a sufficient safeguard for A’s 
rights, including the court’s potential intervention, and there is no evidence 
suggesting that the compelled testimony will be shared with U.S. criminal 
authority.383 The court specifically pointed out that: “It would be surprising 
indeed, given the need for cross-border securities enforcement, if a U.S. 
Court did not pay attention to, let alone honour, a Canadian process 
375. Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c S5. (Can.).
376. Id. § 11(1)(a).
377. Id. § 11(1)(b).
378. Id. §§ 11(3)–(4), 13(1).
379. Id. § 17(2.1).
380. Id. §§ 17(3), 17(7).
381. MMoU, supra note 360, §10(a), (b). Under the MMoU, however, the SEC has 
to specify the purpose for which information sought will be used. MMoU, supra note 360,
§10(a). If the SEC, does not specify that information may be used in criminal proceedings, 
the SEC must obtain the consent of the requested authority. Id. § 10(b). 
382. A v. Ontario Sec. Commission, [2006] 141 C.R.R. 2d, (Can. S.C.C.).
383. Id. ¶¶ 44–48. 
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designed to preserve [the self-incrimination privilege] in Canada.”384 The 
court further recommended that the OSC should establish an information 
wall by having separate investigation teams for Section 11(1)(a) 
investigation (i.e., the OSC’s own investigation) and Section 11(1)(b) 
investigation (i.e., investigation to assist the SEC).385
Because there is a possibility that the evidence compelled by a 
Canadian securities regulator may be used by the DOJ without the 
witness’s consent or knowing even if the securities regulator follows the 
Supreme Court’s recommendation above, practitioners observe that there 
would be three options that the witness may take: “(1) refuse to cooperate 
and risk being held liable for contempt by the court, (2) cooperate and risk 
having the evidence used in U.S. criminal proceedings, and (3) cooperate 
while trying to negotiate additional protections and assurances,” from the 
Canadian regulator.386
5. Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, securities regulators can obtain and use self-
incriminatory evidence on condition that they will not use such evidence 
in criminal proceedings.387 The Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission (the “HKSFC”) can assist foreign regulators under Section 
186 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (the “SFO”). Under Section 
186, the HKSFC can assist a regulator outside Hong Kong that performs a 
function similar to those of the HKSFC.388 When considering a request 
from a foreign regulator, the HKSFC must be satisfied that doing so is “in 
the interest of the investing public or in the public interest” or that “the 
assistance will enable or assist the recipient of the assistance to perform 
its or his functions.”389
Section 181 of SFO authorize the HKSFC to require and compel 
disclosure of information about details of securities transactions.390
384. Id. ¶ 53.
385. Id. ¶ 61. Some practitioners doubt whether having separate teams will have a 
tangible difference Jennings, supra note 256, at 1.
386. See Jennings, supra note 256, at 1.
387. See Securities and Futures Ordinance, No. 5, (2002) O.H.K. § 186(6) (H.K.) 
(prohibiting the SFC from proving incriminating for use in criminal proceedings outside 
of Hong Kong).
388. Id. § 186(1). 
389. Id. § 186(3). 
390. Id. § 181.
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Section 186(6), however, adds restriction under the self-incrimination 
privilege as follows: 
If a person is required— (a) to provide or make an explanation or 
statement as required by an authorized person . . . ; or (b) to give an 
explanation or further particulars as required by, or to give an answer to 
any question as raised by, an investigator . . . and the explanation or 
statement, the explanation or further particulars, or the answer (as the 
case may be) might tend to incriminate him and he so claims . . . the 
authorized person or investigator (as the case may be) shall not provide 
evidence of the requirement and the explanation or statement, the 
explanation or further particulars, or the question and answer (as the case 
may be) to an authority, regulatory organization or companies inspector 
outside Hong Kong for use in criminal proceedings against him.391
The provision prohibits the use only in criminal proceedings, but not in 
other proceedings to impose a penalty, unlike the restriction in 
Australia.392 Therefore, the provision does not seem to prohibit the use in 
administrative monetary penalty proceedings.  
A Hong Kong company, however, tried to suppress evidence that the 
HKSFC provided to the Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission (“JSESC”), alleging that the HKSFC acted unconstitutionally 
because it provided self-incriminatory evidence to the JSESC for its use in 
administrative monetary penalty proceedings.393 In this case, the JSESC 
found that the Hong Kong company conducted market manipulation and 
recommended the Prime Minister and the Commissioner of the Financial 
Services Agency to issue an administrative monetary penalty payment 
order.394 During the investigation, the JSESC obtained information of the 
Hong Kong company through the HKSFC.395 The Hong Kong company 
brought judicial review proceedings against the HKSFC in the Court of 
391. Id. (emphasis added).  
392. See supra Section III.B.3 (describing the restriction of the use of “information 
and evidence” under the MABRA). 
393. AA v. Sec. and Futures Commission, [2016] 4 H.K.C. 515, ¶ 49 (H.K.P.L.R.) 
(Initial decision) (deciding to commence the judicial review proceedings).
394. Press Release, SESC, Recommendation for Administrative Monetary Order for 
Manipulation by Areion Asset Management Company (Dec. 5, 2014).
395. See AA v. Sec. and Futures Commission, [2016] 4 H.K.C. 515, ¶ 49 
(H.K.P.L.R.).
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First Instance, claiming unconstitutionality of Section 181 of the SFO, 
which authorizes the HKSFC to share information with foreign 
regulators.396
The Hong Kong company argues that Section 181 is unconstitutional 
because, among others, it compels the production of potentially self-
incriminatory information without supplying any protection against the 
use in criminal proceedings by foreign regulators.397 Although its 
reasoning is not clear, the Hong Kong company apparently argues that 
Japanese administrative proceedings to impose administrative monetary 
penalty is a “criminal proceeding.”398 The court allowed the case to 
proceed, finding that there was a reasonably arguable case and the case 
had a realistic prospect of success.399 Although the court held that the 
Japanese proceedings are “non-criminal and non-penal in character and 
properly categorized as administrative or regulatory proceedings,”400 if the 
relevant provision or HKSFC’s practice had been held unconstitutional, it 
would have greatly hindered administrative information exchange 
between Hong Kong and Japan. 
6. Japan
Japanese law has broad restrictions on the use of information and 
documents in criminal proceedings. Section 189(4) of the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Act (“FIEA”) provides that “appropriate 
measures shall be taken to ensure that [materials provided] will not be used 
for criminal procedures conducted by a court or a judge in the foreign 
396. See id. ¶ 57. Juridical review allows citizens to challenge decisions made by 
public authorities. Research Office, Legislative Council Secretariat, Administration of 
Justice and Legal Services Apr. 26, 2017. Applicants for judicial must first obtain “leave”
from the court, which will be granted “if the case is reasonably arguable and has a realistic 
prospect of success.” Id.
397. See AA v. Sec. and Futures Commission, [2016] 4 H.K.C. 515, ¶ 50 
(H.K.P.L.R.) (noting that the Hong Kong company, however, does not argue that there 
were unreasonable searches and seizures).
398. See id ¶ 47.
399. Id ¶ 58.
400. AA & Anor v. Sec. and Futures Commission, [2019] 3 H.K.C. 187, ¶ 149 
(H.K.P.L.R.).
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state.”401 This provision serves two main purposes. First, it preserves a 
fundamental legal philosophy in Japan that strictly distinguish 
administrative proceedings and criminal proceedings.402 Second, it 
prevents regulators from bypassing provisions of the Act on International 
Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters403 that provide 
procedures required to follow in assisting the criminal investigation by 
foreign authorities.404
When Japan applied to the IOSCO to become a signatory of the MMoU, 
the screening committee of the IOSCO first thought that this provision 
might conflict with the MMoU.405 Paragraph 10 (Permissible Uses of 
Information) of the MMoU provides as follows:
(a) The Requesting Authority may use non-public information and non-
public documents furnished in response to a request for assistance under 
this Memorandum of Understanding solely for . . . a purpose within the 
general framework of the use stated in the request for assistance, 
including . . . assisting in a criminal prosecution, or conducting any 
investigation for any general charge applicable to the violation of the 
provision specified in the request where such general charge pertains to 
a violation of the Laws and Regulations administered by the Requesting 
Authority.406
The screening committee argued that Section 189(4) of the FIEA would 
prevent Japanese securities regulators from assisting foreign authorities in 
a criminal prosecution.407 Japan responded with three counter-arguments. 
First, if a foreign regulator needs assistance in a criminal prosecution, it 
can obtain evidence through the procedure under the Act on International 
401. KINYU SH?HIN TORIHIKIH? [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Act No. 
25 of 1948, art.189(4), translated in (http://www.japaneselawtranslatija.go.jp/) (emphasis 
added).
402. Akihiro Mizukawa, IOSCO MMOU heno shomei ni tsuite [About Signing of 
IOSCO MMOU], 274 GEKKAN SHIHON SHIJO [MONTHLY CAP. MKT. J.] 55, 60 (2008) 
(Japan).
403. KOKUSAI KY?JO T?NI KANSURU H?RITSU [Act on International Assistance in 
Investigation and Other Related Matters], Act No. 69 of 1980. 
404. Mizukawa, supra note 402, at 60.
405. Id. at 61.
406. MMoU, supra note 360, § 10(a) (emphasis added). 
407. Mizukawa, supra note 402, at 61.
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Assistance in Investigation and Other Related Matters, not the FIEA.408
Second, the main purpose of the MMoU is to provide a framework for 
cooperation between securities regulators, not between criminal 
authorities.409 Other multilateral criminal cooperation frameworks, such as 
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty,410 will not be used if the MMoU 
enables any type of criminal assistance.411 Third, some existing 
signatories, such as Australia and New Zealand, have domestic laws 
prohibiting the use of self-incriminating evidence in a criminal 
prosecution.412 The screening committee accepted these arguments and 
approved Japan as a new signatory in 2008.413
7. Singapore
A case in Singapore in 1998 also shows how a proceeding can affect 
international cooperation. Under Section 3(b) of the Evidence (Civil 
Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act of Singapore, assistance to foreign 
authorities may be allowed only if the High Court of Singapore is satisfied 
that the evidence is to be “obtained for the purposes of civil proceedings 
which either have been instituted before the requesting court or whose 
institution before that court is contemplated.”414 Singaporean residents 
challenged SEC’s request claiming that U.S. civil proceedings instituted 
by the SEC would be characterized as criminal in nature.415
Under case law, criminal proceedings include not only those for 
“prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanours” but also 
those “in favour of the State for the recovery of pecuniary benefits for any 
violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue.”416 Accordingly, the 
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Japan-U.S., 
Aug. 6, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-12 (2003) (stipulating that each contracting party 
shall, upon request by the other contracting party, provide mutual legal assistance in 
connection with investigations, prosecutions and other proceedings in criminal matters).
411. Mizukawa, supra note 402, at 61.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Evidence (Civil Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act § 3(b) (Act No. 
18/1979) (Sing.).
415. SEC v. Ong Congqin Bobby & Anor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 19, 19 (Sing.).
416. Id. ¶ 11. 
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court found that civil penalties sought by the SEC were penal in nature 
because the money collected would go to the Treasury.417 The court, 
however, held that assistance could be provided because an injunctive 
relief sought by the SEC would be civil in nature both under the Singapore 
and U.S. laws.418
In 2000, the Securities and Futures Act authorized the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore to assist foreign securities regulators.419 The Act 
provides that, in relation to a request to the MAS by a foreign regulatory 
authority for assistance, “[a] person is not excused from making an oral 
statement . . . on the ground that the statement might tend to incriminate 
him,” but such incriminating statement “may not be admissible in evidence 
against him in criminal proceedings” in foreign countries.420
8. United Kingdom
The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) has a broad discretion to 
assist its foreign counterparts and exercises that discretion liberally under 
Section 169 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (“FSMA”).421 In 
considering the exercise of its discretion, the FSA may take into account, 
among others, whether corresponding assistance would be given by the 
foreign state and whether it is appropriate in the public interest to provide 
the assistance sought.422
Although self-incriminatory evidence compelled by the FCA will be 
inadmissible in U.K. criminal proceedings,423 the FSMA is silent on 
admissibility in criminal proceedings in foreign jurisdictions.424 Given the 
risk, practitioners advise that “interviewees should request, in advance of 
417. Id. ¶ 13.
418. Id. ¶ 14-16.
419. See Securities and Futures Act § 170(1)(a) (Act No. 52/2001) (Sing.) (stating 
that the MAS may assist a foreign regulatory authority if “the request by the regulatory 
authority for assistance is received by the Authority on or after 6th March 2000.”).
420. Id. § 172(6).
421. See Proudlock & Rundle, supra note 299; Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, c. 8, § 169 (UK).
422. See Financial Services and Markets Act § 169(4).
423. See supra Section II.B.6 (discussing inadmissibility in the United Kingdom).
424. For example, the DOJ tried to use the compelled statement obtained by the 
FCA in criminal proceedings in the United States. See supra Section III.A.2.b (discussing 
United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017)). 
2019] Information Exchange Between Securities Regulators 109
the interview, that the FCA obtain an undertaking from the overseas 
regulator that any compelled information will not be used in any criminal 
proceedings.”425 Although “[t]here is no statutory requirement for the FCA 
to seek and obtain such an undertaking, . . . in practice they appear to be 
doing so in circumstances where the overseas regulator has criminal 
prosecution powers.”426 Practitioners also observe that “[t]he position is 
less clear-cut in relation to non-criminal proceedings initiated in the 
jurisdiction of the overseas.”427
9. Summary
As described in Section II.C above, among seven jurisdictions (the 
United States, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and the 
United Kingdom), five jurisdictions except for the United States where the 
SEC has a broad authority to obtain documents without a warrant and 
Japan where the administrative search is conducted on a voluntary basis, 
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by administrative securities 
regulators by requiring a search warrant issued by a judge.428 I found, 
however, no law in the seven jurisdictions that restricts the use of evidence 
obtained by a requested regulator through “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” in criminal proceedings of the requesting regulator.429 Because 
the securities regulators may “reasonably” obtain documents and 
information either by just requesting the production of regulated entities, 
425. Proudlock & Rundle, supra note 299.
426. Id. They further argue that if the FCA failed to offer such a protection, the 
interviewee should have a “reasonable excuse” for not complying with the request to be 
interviewed. Id.
427. Id.
428. See supra Section II.C.
429. See id. Because those laws concern assistance to foreign regulators, they do 
provide for cases in which domestic regulators use evidence obtained by unreasonable 
searches and seizure conducted by foreign regulators. Id. Although those cases are 
probably out of scope of the MMoU, a U.S. case discussed in Section III.A.2.a informs 
what the rule should be. See United States v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2568 (1995). In the United States, evidence obtained by foreign police 
officers from searches conducted in their own countries normally is admissible in U.S. 
courts, regardless of whether the search complies with the Fourth Amendment except if the 
conduct of the foreign officials during the search and seizure “shocks the judicial 
conscience,” U.S. law enforcement officials substantially participated in the search, or the 
foreign officials conducting the search were actually acting as agents. See id.
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asking consent to produce on a voluntary basis, or obtaining a search 
warrant, regulators do not need to resort to “unreasonable” searches and 
seizures.430 In addition, domestic laws probably do not contemplate a 
situation where the requested regulator knowingly violates constitutional 
protections afforded in its jurisdiction by conducting unreasonable 
searches and seizures for the requesting foreign regulator. On the other 
hand, because many securities regulators can compel self-incriminatory 
statements, domestic laws need to prevent the use of such statements in 
foreign criminal proceedings, which is the main source of the problems 
described in the following section. 
As for self-incriminating evidence, there are three approaches among 
the seven jurisdictions. First, in Australia, there is restriction of the use of 
self-incriminating evidence in not only criminal proceedings, but also any 
proceedings to impose a penalty by the requesting regulator.431 Second, in 
four jurisdictions (Ontario, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan), there are 
restrictions on the use of self-incriminating evidence in criminal 
proceedings by the requesting regulator.432 Ontario Securities Act requires 
consent of the witness for the securities regulator to disclose compelled 
evidence to foreign criminal enforcement authorities.433 In the case of 
Japan, such restriction extends not only to self-incriminating evidence but 
to any evidence.434 Note that the domestic laws of Australia, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore concerning the use of information obtained through 
administrative investigations by foreign criminal proceedings are similar 
to those concerning the use by domestic criminal proceedings.435
Administrative investigators in these jurisdictions can compel self-
incriminatory evidence, but such evidence may not be used in either 
domestic or foreign criminal proceedings (in case of Australia, it may not 
be used in proceedings to impose a penalty either).436 Third, in two 
430. See supra Section III.A.2.a.
431. See supra Section III.B.3.
432. See supra Sections III.B.4–7.
433. See supra Section III.B.4.
434. The complete ban on the use of information and documents tries to preserve a 
fundamental legal philosophy in Japan that strictly distinguish administrative proceedings 
and criminal proceedings and prevent regulators from bypassing provisions of another 
statute that provides procedures required to follow in assisting criminal investigation by 
foreign authorities. See supra notes 402-404 and accompanying text.
435. See supra Sections III.B.4, III.B.5, III.B.7.
436. See supra Sections III.B.3, III.B.5, III.B.7.
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jurisdictions (the United States and the United Kingdom), there is no 
restriction in the use of self-incriminatory evidence in any proceedings by 
the requesting regulator.437
The lack of apparent restriction in the use of self-incriminatory 
evidence by foreign regulators makes sense in the United States where 
domestically the courts will decide whether an administrative 
investigation is conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence to 
be used in criminal proceedings or otherwise is used in bad faith by 
criminal authorities.438 As seen in Section II.B above, however, the law of 
the United Kingdom explicitly prohibits the use of self-incriminatory 
evidence in their domestic criminal proceedings, but there is no restriction 
in foreign proceedings.439 This may give an opportunity for a regulator to 
circumvent its domestic constitutional protection against self-
incrimination in bad faith by using administrative investigations in the 
United Kingdom as a sham,440 but these countries may be relying on other 
regulators’ good faith in preserving the self-incrimination privilege in the 
United Kingdom.441
C. Implications to Cross-Border Information Exchange
1. Problems
The different national approaches with respect to cross-border 
exchange of compelled self-incriminatory evidence between securities 
regulators, as summarized in the previous section, cause three problems. 
437. See supra Sections III.B.2, III.B.8.
438. The SEC may arguably refuse a request of a foreign regulator that tries to 
circumvent its domestic constitutional protection by using SEC’s investigatory power as a 
sham, reasoning that compliance with the request would prejudice the public interest of the 
United States.  
439. See supra Section II.B.6.
440. Under U.S. case law, however, such evidence would be inadmissible in the 
United States. See supra note 345 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that 
the Fifth Amendment applies to foreign compelled statements).
441. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. As the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice stated, “It would be surprising indeed, given the need for cross-border securities 
enforcement, if a U.S. Court did not pay attention to, let alone honour, a Canadian process 
designed to preserve [the self-incrimination privilege] in Canada.” A v. Ont. Sec. Comm’n, 
[2006] O.J. No. 1768, ¶ 53 (Ont. Super. Ct. Just.).
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First, securities regulators may not use any documents and information 
that the Japanese securities regulator obtained through administrative 
investigations in their criminal proceedings (although this problem is not 
what I try to solve under the MMoU).442 Second, the assertion of self-
incrimination privileges in one country may impede the sharing of 
evidence and information with another country for use in administrative 
proceedings in order to seek civil or administrative monetary penalty. 
Third, a securities regulator may circumvent the privilege afforded 
domestically by relying on compelled evidence obtained abroad.  
Some securities regulators may want to introduce administrative 
penalties to have more flexibility and efficiency in their enforcement; 
other securities regulators that already have an option to initiate 
administrative proceedings may try to strengthen their deterrent effect by 
raising the upper limit of administrative monetary penalties as Japan has 
recently done.443 These administrative enforcement tools will also fill 
regulatory gaps and avoid overdeterrence. However, even if such 
enforcement tools are labeled as “administrative” under their domestic 
laws, they could be construed as “quasi-criminal” in some other 
jurisdictions.444
As examined in Section II.B, in all six jurisdictions but Hong Kong, 
securities regulators may seek civil or administrative “monetary 
penalties,” which are in addition to or more than the amount of 
disgorgement of illegal profits.445 Laws of the seven jurisdictions are 
divided on the question of whether the self-incrimination privilege is 
available in securities regulators’ civil or administrative monetary penalty 
proceedings in the domestic settings. Such a question might be more 
complicated in the international setting.446 As seen above, at least the law 
of Australia clearly extends the protection of the self-incrimination 
442. See supra Section III.B.6.
443. For example, the 2013 Amendment Act defined the administrative monetary 
penalty for insider trading committed as part of the asset management as three months’
management fees. See Sadakazu Osaki, Regulatory Reform in the Wake of Insider Trading 
Incidents Related to Public Offerings of New Shares, NRI PAPERS, Nov. 1, 2013, No. 190, 
at 5.
444. See, e.g., supra Section II.A.2.c.
445. See supra Section II.B.
446. See supra Section II.C.
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privilege to “proceedings to impose a penalty.”447 Though the law of Hong 
Kong seems to restrict the use in “criminal” proceedings only, as the case 
described in Section III.B.5 shows, a court may interpret criminal 
proceedings as including administrative monetary penalty proceedings.448
Similarly, the law of Singapore seems to restrict the use in “criminal” 
proceedings only, but in one case a court found that civil penalties sought 
by the SEC were penal in nature because the money collected would go to 
the Treasury.449 The more administrative penalties are enhanced, the more 
likely they would be deemed quasi-criminal in cross-border cases.450
Therefore, securities regulators that have “quasi-criminal” authority may 
face significant challenges in information exchange.
2. Policy Behind Different Approaches
Should protection of individuals against compelled self-incrimination 
extend to foreign criminal proceedings? The approach to extend the self-
incrimination privilege to foreign proceedings, taken by Australia, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore,451 is probably taken in order to protect their own 
citizens’ constitutional rights in foreign proceedings and to prevent foreign 
criminal regulators from circumventing constitutional protections. The 
approach can also be supported by cosmopolitanism, which in general 
holds “the moral dignity and equality of all human beings as individuals, 
regardless of their culture, nationality, or citizenship.”452 In view of 
cosmopolitanism, the protection against the self-incrimination in one 
jurisdiction should extend not only to its resident in domestic proceedings, 
but also to foreign residents in foreign proceedings.453 Universal 
acceptance of such protection corroborates this argument.454 A rule 
447. See supra Section II.B.1.
448. See supra Section III.B.5.
449. See supra Section III.B.7.
450. See supra Section III, ¶ 3.
451. See supra Sections III.B.3, III.B.5, III.B.7.
452. Rosemary Nagy, Postapartheid Justice: Can Cosmopolitanism and Nation-
Building Be Reconciled?, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 623, 624 (2006).
453. See id.
454. See supra Section I (finding universal acceptance of the protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination); see also Amann, supra note 
67, at 1202 (1998) (arguing that U.S. courts should apply self-incrimination privilege not 
only in the domestic, but also in the international context); Neal Modi, Note, Toward an 
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limiting the application of the protection within its jurisdiction will also 
invite securities regulators to circumvent the protections in many cases in 
which it would be difficult for the subject of the investigation to prove that 
the regulators acted in bad faith.
In contrast, the approach taken by the United States and the United 
Kingdom, which does not restrict the use of compelled self-incriminating 
evidence in foreign criminal proceedings,455 can be supported by the statist 
view of international relations. According to this view, “nation-states are 
the ultimate source of legal or moral authority, and their integrity is 
guaranteed by principles of nonintervention and national self-
determination.”456 The statists argue that the nation provides the best 
context in which rights and obligations are determined because co-
nationals share historical, political, and territorial values.457 They criticize 
cosmopolitanism on the grounds that a citizen of the world “is in fact a 
citizen of nowhere” and “the promotion of cosmopolitan universality is 
inevitably the imposition of somebody else’s values.”458 The approach, 
however, may not necessarily reflect statism. As noted in the previous 
section, the United Kingdom may be relying on other regulators’ good 
faith in preserving the self-incrimination privilege.459 In the case of the 
United States, the statutory provision allowing the SEC to refuse a request 
for assistance if the assistance would “prejudice the public policy of the 
United States”460 may reflect cosmopolitanism.
In the context of securities enforcement, while I believe the integrity of 
each regulator should be guaranteed by “principles of nonintervention and 
International Right Against Self-Incrimination: Expanding the Fifth Amendment’s 
“Compelled” to Foreign Compulsion, 103 VA. L. REV. 961, 969 (2017) (arguing that U.S. 
courts should protect foreign-compelled testimony from use and derivative use to uphold 
the Fifth Amendment policies).
455. See supra Sections II.B.2, II.B.8.
456. Nagy, supra note 452, at 624.
457. See id.; see also Kok-Chor Tan, Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan 
Justice, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 436–37 (2002) (arguing that common 
nationality provides a basis of self-identity and a crucial bond for a community of 
obligation).
458. Nagy, supra note 452, at 624; see also Robert Fine, Taking the “Ism” out of 
Cosmopolitanism: An Essay in Reconstruction, 6 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 451, 452 (2003) 
(arguing that cosmopolitanism contradicts with guiding principle of international law that 
recognizes national sovereignty).
459. See supra Section III.B.9.
460. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (2012).
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national self-determination” as the statists argue, each regulator should 
respect the policy behind national laws so to protect individuals 
“regardless of their culture, nationality, or citizenship” under 
cosmopolitanism.461 The MMoU, therefore, should provide a workable 
solution to bridge the different national approaches. The solution should 
be based on the most restrictive rule concerning the use of compelled self-
incriminatory evidence, such as the one in Australia,462 because such a 
solution will not require any member jurisdiction to violate its domestic 
law.
I posed two questions. We assumed that an investor residing in one 
country, where securities regulator X oversees the market, commits 
market manipulation or insider trading in another country where securities 
regulator Y oversees the market. Can Y use in its administrative “penalty” 
proceedings the documents and information that X collected through an 
administrative investigation when the similar use in X’s country would 
violate the constitutional or statutory protections in X’s country? Also, can 
Y use in its criminal proceedings the documents and information that X 
collected using methods that, if conducted by Y in Y’s country, would 
violate constitutional protections in Y’s country?  
The answer to the first question depends on the nature of Y’s 
administrative proceeding. If the proceeding seeks only to disgorge ill-
gotten gains, Y should be allowed to use the documents and information, 
because such proceeding is not its very nature a criminal proceeding nor a 
proceeding to bring a true penal consequence. The answer to the second 
question should be “no” under cosmopolitanism (and “yes” under statism), 
but I do not believe the MMoU is the place to give the answer to this 
question.
3. Current MMoU
Currently, the MMoU does not have any provision explicitly referring 
to the self-incrimination privilege.463 However, Article 6(e) of the MMoU 
permits the requested authority to deny a request for assistance “where the 
request would require the Requested Authority to act in a manner that 
461. Nagy, supra note 452, at 624.
462. See supra Section III.B.3.
463. See generally MMoU, supra note 360.
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would violate domestic law.”464 Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia 
have “domestic law” to prohibit foreign regulators from using compelled 
self-incriminatory evidence in criminal proceedings.465 Therefore, 
securities regulators in jurisdictions that have similar laws may deny a 
request for self-incriminatory evidence to be used in “quasi-criminal” 
proceedings of the requesting regulator.
The IOSCO recognizes that the self-incrimination privilege may affect 
information exchange between securities regulators. The ISOCO observes 
that in some jurisdictions, a statement that has been compelled from a 
person may not be used against him in a criminal proceeding, and in other 
jurisdictions, have a corresponding privilege against self-incrimination 
that allows the person giving the statement to refuse to make a statement 
that could incriminate him.466 The IOSCO, therefore, recommends that 
regulators should take the privilege into account when considering 
whether statements will be compelled, who will compel them, and how 
they will be used in a subsequent proceeding so that they can avoid 
inadvertently preventing a regulator from using a statement as evidence.467
The current provisions of MMoU, however, do not provide any specific 
solution.468
464. Id. § 6(e).
465. See supra Sections III.B.3, III.B.5, III.B.7.
466. IOSCO, THE BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES 
COMMISSIONS, JOINT CROSS-BORDER INVESTIGATIONS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS 17
(2014) (unpublished report) (on file with author) (hereinafter IOSCO REPORT).
467. Id.
468. See generally MMoU, supra note 360. The EMMoU, an enhanced version of 
the MMoU as described in Section II.C above, does not provide any solution to issue either, 
but added a new provision that states: 
The assistance available under this Enhanced MMoU includes . . . [c]ompelling a Person’s
physical attendance to take or, where permissible, compel that Person’s statement or 
testimony under oath, regarding the matters set forth in the request for assistance, in 
accordance with the rights and privileges afforded by the laws and regulations applicable 
in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority.
IOSCO, Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation 
and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (EMMoU) (2016), art. 3(2)(c), 
https://www.iosco.org/about/pdf/Text-of-the-EMMoU.pdf. In its FAQs to the EMMoU, 
the IOSCO responds as follows: 
The EMMoU does not compromise the privilege against self-incrimination. Conscious of 
the protections that many jurisdictions place on the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
EMMoU only requires that a signatory have the power to compel the “attendance or 
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IV. SOLUTIONS
As described above, even if a securities regulator in one country intends 
to use, not in its criminal proceedings but in its “administrative 
proceedings,” information and documents obtained through securities 
regulators in another country, such as Australia, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, the former requesting regulator will have to prove that its 
administrative proceedings are neither criminal proceedings nor 
proceedings to impose a penalty.469 This will pose challenges for both the 
requesting and requested regulators. The MMoU, therefore, should 
provide guidance as to how to deal with this issue and a standard to decide 
the nature of the proceedings. 
A. Ex-post Solutions
Even under the current framework as it applies to Australian law, which 
is most restrictive against the use of self-incriminatory evidence by foreign 
regulators, the requesting regulator has four solutions regardless of the 
nature of its proceedings.470 First, when the self-incrimination privilege 
applies only to “information or evidence,” but not to a “document” that 
covers the contents of the information or evidence, requesting regulators 
may seek such a document. For example, in Australia, the MABRA covers 
requests for “information, documents and evidence,”471 but the restriction 
appearance” of an individual at a specified location for interview, not that the individual 
should have to answer the questions posed.
IOSCO, Enhanced Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation 
and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (EMMoU): Frequently Asked 
Questions, ¶ 15, https://www.iosco.org/about/pdf/EMMoU-Frequently-Asked-
Questions.pdf.
469. See supra Section III.C.
470. See supra Section III.B.3.
471. MABRA, supra note 367, art. 5. For example, Article 5 explicitly provides that 
the object of the MABRA is “to enable Commonwealth regulators to render assistance to 
foreign regulators in their administration or enforcement of foreign business laws by 
obtaining from persons relevant information, documents and evidence and transmitting 
such information and evidence and copies of such documents to foreign regulators.” Id.
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of the use under Articles 6(2)(a) and 14 of the MABRA applies only to 
“information or evidence.”472
Second, the requesting regulator may use “information or evidence” in 
criminal proceedings or proceedings to impose a penalty for any purpose 
other than using it as “evidence.”473 For example, the requesting regulator 
may use “information or evidence” as background information so that the 
requesting regulator can understand the case better, a basis for seeking 
other admissible evidence, or evidence against a third party.474
Third, the requesting regulator may use “information or evidence” as 
evidence in administrative or civil proceedings that do not seek penalties, 
but to seek other remedies such as injunction and administrative bar.475 In 
this case, however, the requesting regulator may still be required to prove 
that such remedies are not construed as a “penalty” under applicable 
laws.476
Fourth, if the requesting regulator needs to use “information or 
evidence” as evidence in a criminal proceeding or a proceeding to impose 
a penalty, the requesting regulator can use a framework for assistance in 
criminal proceedings under mutual criminal assistance agreements such as 
the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 in Australia.477 Such 
assistance in criminal proceedings, however, may be cumbersome and 
take time.
B. Proposed MMoU Provision
Although the four solutions above may work as ex-post solutions, 
securities regulators should benefit from having an ex-ante solution, which 
clarifies whether the exchange of self-incriminatory evidence is possible. 
Therefore, I propose three provisions to be added to the MMoU. 
472. MABRA, supra note 367, arts. 6, 14. In addition, the self-incrimination 
privilege may not apply to the document in Australia. See supra note 230 and 
accompanying text (explaining the self-incrimination privilege under Australian law).
473. See, e.g., M. Mann, supra note 373, at 812 (describing permissible uses of 
information and evidence).
474. See id.
475. See id. (arguing that the SEC can use it in administrative proceedings but 
cannot seek a civil penalty). 
476. See supra Section III.B.5 (describing a case in Hong Kong).
477. See generally Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) pt II div 
2 s 13 (Austl.). The Hague Evidence Convention may not work as a solution here because 
the Convention deals with evidence collection in civil or commercial matters. 
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First, the following provision recommends that when a securities 
regulator makes a request for information, the requesting securities 
regulator consult with another regulator to confirm whether there is any 
limitation on the use of the information received:
A Requesting Authority will, as soon as practicable before making a 
request for assistance, consult with a potential Requested Authority to 
confirm (i) whether there is any limitation for the Requesting Authority 
to use information received in its criminal proceedings or proceedings to 
impose a penalty, and (ii) whether a proceeding of the Requesting 
Authority would likely be construed as criminal proceedings or 
proceedings to impose a penalty.  
Second, the following provision clarifies a policy that a securities 
regulator who seeks information in good faith should be allowed to use 
information in its administrative or civil proceeding without implicating 
constitutional issues under the laws of the requested regulator. This 
provision is based on the most restrictive rule concerning the use of 
compelled self-incriminatory evidence, such as the one in Australia, so it 
should be acceptable to all member jurisdictions: 
Civil or administrative proceedings of the Requesting Authority to seek 
a monetary penalty, as long as the amount of which will not exceed a 
reasonable approximation of the financial benefit derived directly from 
the applicable violation of the Laws and Regulations of the Requesting 
Authority, will not be construed by the Requested Authority as criminal 
proceedings or proceedings to impose a penalty.  
Third, the following provision clarifies the policy that a securities 
regulator should not circumvent the privilege afforded domestically by 
relying on compelled evidence obtained abroad. This provides not only an 
opportunity for securities regulators to take constitutional protections in 
other jurisdictions seriously, which should be supported by the 
cosmopolitanism, but also provides more credibility to the requesting 
regulator in its own jurisdiction that it acted on good faith: 
In making the request for assistance, the Requesting Authorities will 
represent to the Requested Authority that the Requesting Authority has 
no intent to use assistance by the Requested Authority to bypass the 
constitutional protections in the jurisdiction of the Requesting Authority.  
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These new provisions will best balance the interest of the requested 
securities regulator to protect fundamental rights of the residents of its 
jurisdiction and the interest of the requesting securities regulator to fully 
utilize assistance of the requested securities regulator. 
APPENDIX A: UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
1. Argentina
Article 18 of the National Constitution provides that “dwellings, 
personal correspondence and private documents shall not be violated or 
trespassed, and a statute is to determine in what cases and under what 
circumstances their search and occupation shall be permitted.”478 This 
provision does not set a reasonable standard or any other similar guidance 
as to valid searches and seizures.479
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides for warrant requirements and 
other procedures. For example, Article 225 of the Code requires that 
searches in “private dwellings must be conducted in daylight hours” 
except in cases of emergency or with consent.480 A judicial warrant is 
generally required to enter into a private dwelling except for “exigent 
circumstances, such as the police being in hot pursuit, or hearing voices 
asking for help from inside the house.”481 Article 234 also authorizes a 
court to seize any written communication sent by or addressed to the 
accused so long as such interception is deemed to be “useful for the 
determination whether a crime has been committed.”482
2. Canada
Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the 
“Charter”), a bill of rights included in the Constitution of Canada, 
provides: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search 
478. Carrio & Garro, supra note 57, at 3, 11; Art. 18, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL 
[CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
479. See Carrio & Garro, supra note 57, at 11.
480. Id. at 12; CÓDIGO PROCESAL PENAL DE LA NACIÓN [CÓD. PROC. PEN.] art. 225 
(Arg.).
481. Carrio & Garro, supra note 57, at 12; CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 225 (Arg.).
482. Carrio & Garro, supra note 57, at 15; CÓD. PROC. PEN. art. 234 (Arg.).
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or seizure.”483 The courts have defined searches and seizures to include 
“state actions that invade a reasonable expectation of privacy without the 
accused’s consent.”484 For example, “the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Criminal Code provision [that] allowed audio taping of conversations on 
the basis of the consent of [only] one of the parties.485
Warrants are required to conduct invasions of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy.486 Warrants “must be granted by a neutral and 
impartial official[,] . . . generally after reasonable and probable grounds 
have been established . . . that a crime has been committed and that the 
search will reveal evidence of the offense.”487 Warrantless searches can be 
authorized, for example, for searches “for firearms if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence with a firearm has been committed and 
that a warrant cannot be obtained.”488
3. China
Article 37 of the Constitution “appears” to protect certain due process 
rights.489 It provides:
[F]reedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is 
inviolable. No citizens may be arrested except with the approval or by 
decision of a people’s procuratorate or by decision of a people’s court, 
and arrests must be made by a public security organ. Unlawful detention 
or deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of the person by 
detention or other means is prohibited, and unlawful search of the person 
of citizens is prohibited.490
483. Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 57, 66; 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (UK).
484. Roach, supra note 483, at 66.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 67.
487. Id. at 67–68.
488. Id. at 69.
489. See Ira Belkin, China, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 91, 93; XIANFA
art. 37 (1982) (China).
490. XIANFA art. 37 (1982) (China).
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However, “because the Constitution is not self-executing, and because 
courts do not have the authority to invoke the Constitution in deciding 
cases, the rights purportedly protected by Article 37 exist on paper 
only.”491
Under the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, “police may conduct 
searches pursuant to warrants or in the event of an emergency, without a 
warrant.”492 The law, however, “does not set forth the procedure for 
obtaining a warrant,” and the police, who have the complete authority over 
criminal investigations, issue search warrants.493 Although searches must 
be conducted in the presence of the owner of the premises and a record 
must be kept of the circumstances of the search, “[t]here is no legal 
consequence regarding the admissibility of the evidence obtained” without 
following those procedures.494
4. Egypt
The Constitution forbids warrantless entry into homes, warrantless 
surveillance or other seizures of correspondence, and unjustified intrusion 
of citizens’ “private life.”495 “The Code of Criminal Procedure and [the 
court’s decision] elaborate these protections.”496
The Code of Criminal Procedure forbids law enforcement officers from 
conducting warrantless searches of dwellings except in an emergency.497
A search warrant can be issued by the court or the prosecution, but in 
practice, the prosecution issues warrants because it routinely exercises its 
investigative powers.498 The Code provides that a warrant must be based 
on “(1) an accusation that a resident . . . committed or participated in a 
felony or misdemeanor, or (2) ‘strong indicia’ . . . that items related to the 
crime will be found.”499 The court decision additionally requires that 
491. Belkin, supra note 489, at 93.
492. Id. at 100.
493. Id. at 100–01.
494. Id. at 101.
495. Reza, supra note 31, at 119–20; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF 
EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, arts. 57–58.
496. Reza, supra note 31, at 120.
497. Id.; Act. No. 150 of 1950 (Criminal Procedure Code) arts. 45, 91 (Egypt).
498. Reza, supra note 31, at 120; Criminal Procedure Code, art. 91 (Egypt).
499. Reza, supra note 31, at 120; CCP art. 91.
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warrants must be issued based on “seriousness and sufficiency of the 
investigation.”500
Warrants to search homes of non-suspects and “for the seizure or 
surveillance of correspondence . . . must come from an examining 
magistrate or a judge.”501 The prosecution can review “contents of any 
seized or recorded correspondence only in the presence of the suspect, and 
any comments the suspect makes during [the] review [must] be recorded 
and kept with the correspondence.”502
5. France
There are only a few provisions of individual rights in the French 
Constitution, such as the presumption of innocence, and most issues of 
criminal procedure are governed by detailed provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure.503 The preliminary article of CCP provides for two 
general principles applicable to all types of investigations: first, an official 
investigation should be “fair,” attempting to uncover evidence both 
favorable and unfavorable to the accused, “avoiding the use of brutal or 
deceptive methods, and respecting human dignity. Second, all 
investigatory steps must be thoroughly documented, in writing.”504
The police engaged in a “preliminary examination” that applies to any 
crime may conduct searches, enter premises, and seize evidence only if 
they receive the express handwritten consent of the person concerned.505
“[C]ertain specialized law enforcement agents may receive permission” to 
conduct searches and seizures upon application to the judge, which is a 
procedure similar to the procedure for search warrants in the United 
States.506 The examining magistrates have almost complete discretion to 
search any place and seize anything that he deems “useful to the 
manifestation of the truth.”507
500. Reza, supra note 31, at 120.
501. Id. at 121; Criminal Procedure Code, art. 95 (Egypt).
502. Reza, supra note 31, at 121; Criminal Procedure Code, arts. 97, 206 (Egypt).
503. Frase, supra note 26, at 205.
504. Id. at 206.
505. Id. at 207, 211; CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [Criminal Procedure 
Code] art. 76 (Fr.).
506. Frase, supra note 26, at 211.
507. Id.; C. PR. PÉN. art. 81 (Fr.).
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6. Germany
The German Constitution contains some individual rights relevant to
the criminal procedure, such as the right of privacy (Articles 1, 2), the 
inviolability of the home (Article 13), and the secrecy of the mail and of 
communications (Article 10).508 German law, however, “generally accords 
very little protection to persons and buildings against searches.”509 Article 
13 of Basic Law (Constitution) “allows searches if authorized by a judge 
or, if delay would jeopardize the effectiveness of the search, by other 
officers designated by law.”510
“Judicial search orders must be in writing and must specify the 
[premises] to be searched [and] items expected to be found.”511 The 
Federal Constitutional Court held “that the requirement of specificity 
[came] from the constitutional principle that the state must not interfere 
more than necessary with the citizen’s privacy.”512 In practice, the police 
often assume “danger in delay” to obtain search order by designated 
officers, but the Federal Constitutional Court criticized this practice and 
declared “that the police must document the reasons for the impossibility 
of obtaining a [judicial] warrant.”513
7. Israel
The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (the “Basic Law”), enacted 
in 1992, provides for “the fundamental right[s] to personal freedom, which 
includes the right against detention, imprisonment[,] and extradition.”514
The Basic Law also provides that the individuals have the right “to be 
protected against a search of body, personal articles[,] and premises.”515 In 
response, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance requires a warrant for the 
508. Thomas Weigend, Germany, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 243, 
248–49; GRUNDEGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] § 2, arts. 1, 2, 10, 13, translation at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf (Ger.).
509. Weigend, supra note 508, at 249.
510. Id.; GRUNDEGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] § 2, art. 13.
511. Weigend, supra note 508, at 250; BVERFGE 44, 353, ¶ 20 (1977) (Ger.).
512. Weigend, supra note 508, at 250.
513. Id.
514. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 273; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 
§ 5 (1992) (Isr.).
515. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 276; Basic Law, § 7 (Isr.).
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police to search a person’s premises, except for limited circumstances such 
as when a police officer “has reasonable grounds to assume that a felony 
is being committed there” or the suspect consented.516
“A judge has very broad powers to issue a warrant to search
premises.”517 The judge may issue a search warrant, for example, “if the 
search is necessary . . . to assure the presentation of an object” for an 
investigation or trial and “if the judge has reason to believe that the 
location is being used for the storage . . . of a stolen item.”518 In practice, 
“[j]udges tend to issue search warrants ex parte, almost automatically, 
without an extensive examination of the underlying facts.”519
8. Italy
The Italian Constitution provides that “[t]here shall be no form of 
detention, inspection, or search of the person, nor any other restrictions 
whatsoever of personal liberty, except by decision, wherein the reasons 
are stated, by the judicial authorities, and only in cases and in the matter 
prescribed by law.”520 It also provides that in “exceptional cases of 
necessity and urgency, expressly provided for by law, the police may take 
provisional measures.”521 It, therefore, “declares in broad terms the 
sanctity of personal liberty[,] . . . yet expressly permits legislation to 
abrogate these protections in cases of necessity and urgency.”522
The general rule is that search and seizures require a search warrant 
issued by a judge or a public prosecutor.523 More than mere suspicion is 
necessary to issue a warrant because the Code of Criminal Procedure uses 
the term “‘well-founded grounds’ for believing that such relevant evidence 
may be discovered or the defendant may be found.”524 The Police, 
516. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 276; Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Arrest 
and Search) (New Version), 5729–1969, § 25 (Isr.).
517. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 276.
518. Id.; Criminal Procedure Ordinance, § 23 (Isr.).
519. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 276.
520. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 305; Art. 13(2) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
521. Art. 13(3) Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
522. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 305.
523. Id. at 313.
524. Id.; C.p.p. art 247(1) (It.).
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however, may conduct warrantless searches in “exigent circumstances” 
such as when someone is committing a crime or has escaped custody.525
9. Japan
Article 31 of the Constitution provides: “No person shall be deprived 
of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except 
according to procedure established by law.”526 It is interpreted to require 
not only that procedure is established by law, but also that the substance 
of the law must be reasonable and appropriate.527 For example, seizure of 
personal property without prior notice violates article 31.528
Article 35 of the Constitution further provides: 
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects 
against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon 
warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 
33.529
Search warrants must be “issued by a competent judicial officer” for 
each search or seizure.530 The exception under Article 33 applies to 
warrantless searches and seizures reasonably accompanying an arrest.531
10. Mexico
Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution requires: “Every search warrant, 
which can only be issued by judicial authority, and which must be in 
writing, shall specify the place to be searched, the person or persons to be 
525. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 315; C.p.p. art. 247(1) (It.).
526. NIHONKOKU KENP??[KENP?] [CONSTITUTION], art. 31 (Japan).
527. KOJI SATO, JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 587 (3d ed. 1995).
528. Saiko Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 11, 1962, 1955 (A) no. 2961, SAIK? SAIBANSH 
MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] (Japan).
529. NIHONKOKU KENP??[KENP?] [CONSTITUTION], art. 35(1) (Japan).
530. Id. art. 35(2); KEIJI SOSH???? [K??????] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 218, ¶ 1 
(Japan).
531. Code of Criminal Procedure, art 220(3); NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION 227 (3d ed. 2002).
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seized, and the objects sought.”532 The party seeking a warrant “must 
provide presumptive evidence based on a factual foundation that the 
person or thing to be seized would be found in the place to be searched.”533
Federal courts tend to interpret the requirements under Article 16 of the 
Constitution more loosely when the request for the warrant is related to a 
commercial establishment or the search concerns the property of a third 
party.534 The police may also seize objects different from those listed in 
the search warrant if they are in plain-view or discovery of evidence can 
result from a general search conducted by the officers.535
11. Russia
The Russian Constitution contains a number of articles related to 
criminal procedure and civil liberties, including freedom and personal 
inviolability (Article 22), right to the privacy of correspondence, telephone 
conversations, mail, telegraph, and other communications (Article 23), 
and inviolability of the home (Article 25).536
The Criminal Procedure Code in 2002 replaced soviet style Criminal 
Procedure Code, which was adopted in 1960, “to establish a criminal 
justice system based on democratic principles” and not only to make law 
enforcement effective but also to safeguard civil liberties.537 “In 
conformity with the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the 
home, the Code provides that a search of a dwelling and a body search of 
a person be carried out pursuant to a judicial warrant.”538 The grounds for 
532. Miguel Sarré & Jan Perlin, Mexico, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at
351, 357 n.22; Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, art. 16 
(Mex.).
533. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 532, at 357; Código Federal de Procedimientos 
Penales [CFPP], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 30-08-1934, últimas reformas DOF 
09-06-2009, art. 63 (Mex.).
534. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 532, at 358.
535. Id.
536. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] arts. 22, 
23, 25 (Russ.).
537. Catherine Newcombe, Russia, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 20, at 397, 
397.
538. Id. at 425. 
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conducting a search must be based on “sufficient information to believe 
that there exist [items] relevant to a [crime].”539
The Code also requires that “a seizure may be carried out if it is 
necessary to seize certain objects and documents that are relevant to the 
criminal case and if the location and the person in possession of them are 
known.”540 “Seizures are carried out [generally] according to the same 
procedures as searches.”541
12. South Africa
The current South African Constitution came into operation in 1997, 
and before that, “South Africa never had a Bill of Rights.”542 The new 
Constitution “not only represents a complete break with the apartheid era, 
but also replaces parliamentary sovereignty with a Constitution, which [as] 
the supreme law . . . can prevent a repetition of the legislative and 
executive excesses of the past.”543
Section 14 of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has the right to 
privacy, which includes the right no tot have— (a) their person or home 
searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) 
the privacy of their communications infringed.”544 Therefore, under the 
Criminal Procedures Act, “search and seizure without a warrant is only 
exceptionally permitted.”545 “A search warrant may be issued by a 
magistrate or justice of the peace who . . . has reasonable grounds for 
believing that” the item can be found.546 A police officer may conduct 
searches and seizures without a warrant if the subject consents or “if he 
reasonably believes that the delay in obtaining the warrant would defeat 
the object of the search.”547
539. Id.
540. Id. at 428.
541. Id.
542. PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe, South Africa, in WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 20, at 471, 471.
543. Id. at 471–72.
544. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 14.
545. Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 542, at 483.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 484.
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13. United Kingdom
Because the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, 
“there has in the past been no constitutional limitation on the power of 
Parliament to confer [the] police officers” power that may interfere with 
fundamental rights.548 However, “a number of rights . . . under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) became part of English 
law, and took effect [in] 2000 by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.”549
The Convention rights include the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
liberty,550 and the right to respect for private and family life, home, and 
correspondence.551 In addition, under common law, any entry by the police 
would be unlawful without the occupant’s consent, without a warrant 
issued by a statutory power, or without “statutory power to enter without 
warrant.”552 Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 
(“PACE”), a magistrate can issue a warrant to enter premises to search for 
evidence of a crime if there are reasonable grounds for believing that, 
among others, an indictable offence has been committed, there is material 
on premises, which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation, 
and the material is likely to be relevant evidence.553
“At common law, a warrant could authorize entry to only one location 
and on only one occasion.”554 Under the Serious Organized Crime and 
Police Act of 2005, however, a warrant may “authorize multiple entries 
over a period of up to three months.”555 This may infringe upon “important 
protections against arbitrary entries and searches” by removing “the need 
for investigating officers to justify each entry to specific premises.”556 The 
PACE and the Human Rights Act 1998, however, still ensure that any use 
548. Feldman, supra note 23, at 149.
549. Id.
550. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 
echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
551. Id. art. 8.
552. Feldman, supra note 23, at 158.
553. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 v. 60 (Eng.), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/
pdfs/ukpga19840060en.pdf; Feldman, supra note 23, at 158–59.
554. Feldman, supra note 23, at 159.
555. Id.
556. Id.
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of the warrant is necessary in response to a pressing need and 
proportionate, as required by Article 8 of the ECHR.557
APPENDIX B: SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
1. Argentina
Article 18 of the National Constitution provides that “nobody shall be 
compelled to testify against himself.”558 This constitutional guarantee, 
however, operates differently before and after the formal charge in 
court.559 The self-incrimination privilege “is relatively weak when the 
police seek statements, admissions, or confessions from a suspect,” but “is 
more widely and generously applied once the suspect [appears] in court 
and charges are formally brought against him.”560
The Supreme Court of Argentina has issued only one clear standard 
distinguishing “self-incriminating statements given to the police that ought 
to be excluded.”561 Extrajudicial confessions must be excluded “if the 
defendant is able to establish that those statements were extracted under 
coercion.”562 The defendants, however, are unable to meet the burden in 
most of the cases.563
Before the investigative magistrate begins judicial questioning, the 
defendant “must be fully advised of his rights,” including the “right to 
remain silent and to have an attorney present.”564 In practice, most 
defendants voluntarily provide an explanation to avoid responsibility or 
mitigate eventual punishment because the same investigative magistrate 
will rule on whether the accused should face a trial.565
557. Id.
558. Carrio & Garro, supra note 57, at 27.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id. at 30. 
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id. at 31.
565. Id.
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2. Canada
Section 11(c) of the Charter provides: “Any person charged with an 
offence has the right . . . not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings 
against that person in respect of the offence.”566 There is no constitutional 
obligation for criminal interrogators to inform detainees of their right to 
remain silent, but such a warning is customarily given to facilitate proof 
that statements were made voluntarily.567 There is no distinction between 
the accused’s rights to remain silent before and after formal charges in 
court.568
3. China
There is no right to remain silent during interrogation.569 “Article 43 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code prohibits the use of torture and deception to 
obtain evidence [as follows:] ‘it shall be strictly forbidden to extort 
confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit 
or other unlawful means.’”570 Chinese law, however, “does not provide for 
the exclusion of evidence obtained illegally [nor] provide for a procedure 
to determine whether unlawful means were used.”571 In addition, there is 
no right to counsel although a “suspect may hire a lawyer . . . after the 
initial interrogation.”572 As a result, China suffers many incidents “of 
confessions obtained by coercion.”573
In 2012, Congress enacted new amendments to the Criminal Procedure 
Code that include a privilege against self-incrimination.574 Article 50 
provides, “No person may be forced to prove his own guilt.”575 Before the 
566. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 11(c), Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
567. Roach, supra note 483, at 77.
568. Id. at 78.
569. Belkin, supra note 489, at 101.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Profit, supra note 59, at 157.
575. Id.; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (?????????
???) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the 
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enactment of Article 50, Article 93 of the former Criminal Procedure Code 
provided that suspects had no right to remain silent and were obliged to 
answer questions relevant to the investigation.576 Despite the new Code, 
due to the unprecise scope of Article 50 and the apparent continued 
enforcement of old Article 93, it is difficult to determine who is covered 
and when a person is covered.577
4. Egypt
“Neither the [Egyptian] Constitution nor the Code of Criminal 
Procedure explicitly provides defendants” the self-incrimination privilege, 
but it is recognized and enforced in practice.578 The Egyptian Constitution 
provides “that any statement . . . proven to have been compelled by 
‘physical or moral harm’ or threat to such harm is ‘null and void.’”579 The 
Code sets forth “rules and limits on interrogating defendants during the 
investigative process” and trial.580 These provisions and court rulings 
“make it clear that defendants have no obligation to answer questions” 
before and during trial and “that a defendant’s silence should not be 
considered evidence of guilt.”581
While police officers are not ordinarily authorized to interrogate 
arrestees, the prosecution is authorized to interrogate arrestees to decide 
whether to formally charge or release arrestees.582 Under the Judicial 
Directives, prosecutors may not promise a defendant anything or deceive 
a defendant to get him to confess.583 A trial court may not “rely on any 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 2012, effective 
Jan. 1, 2013), art. 50 (China).
576. Profit, supra note 59, at 157. This policy heavily relied “upon Confucian 
principles, which place emphasis on protecting society . . . even at the expense of individual 
rights.” Id.
577. Id. at 158.
578. Reza, supra note 31, at 125.
579. Id.; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, art. 42, 11 Sept. 1971.
580. Reza, supra note 31, at 125.
581. Id.
582. Id. at 125–26.
583. Id. at 126.
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statement . . . that is shown to have been made under compulsion or 
threat.”584
5. France
When a person is put in investigatory detention, he must be advised of 
the rights to inform his family or employer, to be examined by a doctor, 
and to speak in private with an attorney.585 There is no requirement, 
however, for providing a warning as to the right to silence, and in practice, 
such advice is rarely given.586
When a suspect first appears before a magistrate who decides whether 
to formally charge, he must be advised that he has the right to remain 
silent, or may choose to make a statement, or may consent to be 
questioned, except in exigent circumstances, in counsel’s presence.587
Although suspects cannot legally be compelled to speak or formally 
punished for refusing, in practice, suspects respond to most questions.588
6. Germany
Suspects who are investigated must be, at the beginning of an 
interrogation, informed of certain rights, including “that they are free . . . 
to make or not to make a statement with respect to the alleged offense.”589
“This information must be given [in] interrogation by a judge, a 
prosecutor, or a police officer.”590 The suspect, however, need not be 
informed that any statement made can be used against him.591 In practice, 
“to avoid problems of proof, [the] police tend to have suspects sign a 
584. Reza, supra note 31, at 127; Act. No. 150 of 1950 (Criminal Procedure Code) 
arts. 45, 91 (Egypt).
585. Frase, supra note 26, at 216; CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CODE 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] art. 63 (Fr.).
586. Frase, supra note 26, at 216.
587. Id. at 217; C. PR. PÉN, art. 116 (Fr.).
588. Frase, supra note 26, at 218.
589. Weigend, supra note 508, at 256; STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 136, ¶ 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.).
590. Weigend, supra note 508, at 256; StPO, § 163a, ¶¶ 3–4 (Ger.).
591. Weigend, supra note 508, at 256 n.76.
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preformulated statement confirming that they have been advised of their 
rights.”592
The Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly “prohibits attempts to 
influence a suspect’s determination whether to make a statement by 
‘deception,’”593 and any statement obtained as such is inadmissible.594
“Tricks and fraudulent tactics of the police” to obtain a statement from 
suspects are also “generally discouraged by the courts.”595
7. Israel
Although the Basic Law does not explicitly provides for the privilege 
against self-incrimination, “[t]he suspect is granted a right to remain 
silent” during the interrogation.596 “[A] person being interrogated as a 
suspect [must be notified] of his right to remain silent regardless of 
whether . . . he is under arrest.”597 The Supreme Court, however, held that 
such an obligation to notify would not arise when the General Security 
Service conducts an interrogation to extract information “to prevent the 
commission of a future offense against national security.”598
If a statement entails a confession, “the prosecution must prove beyond 
all reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was given freely and 
voluntarily.”599 Criminal Procedure Law provides for the right of a 
defendant to refrain from testifying at his own trial.600 In practice, 
however, most defendants testify at trial because of the possibility of 
viewing the silence of the defendant as support for the prosecution’s 
evidence.601
592. Id. at 257.
593. Id. at 258; StPO, § 136a, ¶ 1 (Ger.).
594. Weigend, supra note 508, at 258; StPO, § 136a, ¶ 3 (Ger.).
595. Weigend, supra note 508, at 258.
596. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 282.
597. Id. at 283.
598. Id.; Smirk v. State of Israel, 56(3) PD 529, 545–46 (1999) (Isr.).
599. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 283; Kandil v. Attorney General, 2 PD 810, 
824–25 (1949) (Isr.).
600. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 283; Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated 
Version], 5742–1982, § 161 (Isr.).
601. Kitai-Sangero, supra note 33, at 285.
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8. Italy
Although the Code of Criminal Procedure “makes a clear distinction 
between a suspect and a defendant” with whom formal criminal 
proceedings have initiated by the prosecutor, it also “provides that a 
suspect is to have [substantially] the same rights and guarantees as a 
defendant.”602 If a person not yet a suspect reveals incriminating evidence 
in the course of exchange with the police, the police must interrupt the 
person and warn him that an investigation may begin against him.603
“Statements made before this warning may not be used against the 
[person].”604
The suspect must be warned of his right to remain silent.605 When a 
suspect makes “spontaneous” statements in the absence of counsel, these 
may not be used at trial, except for purposes of impeachment.606 The Code 
also prohibits methods or techniques likely to violate a suspect’s “freedom 
of self-determination” ability to remember and evaluate facts even if he 
consents to these methods.607
9. Japan
Article 38(1) of the Japanese Constitution provides for the self-
incrimination privilege: “No person shall be compelled to testify against 
himself.”608 This provision is based on the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.609 Article 38(2) further provides: “Confession made under 
compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention shall 
not be admitted in evidence”, and Article 38(3) provides: “No person shall 
be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his 
own confession.”610
602. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 324; Codice di procedura penale [C.p.p.] 
[Criminal Procedure Code] arts. 61, 62 (It.).
603. C.p.p. art. 63(1) (It.).
604. Van Cleave, supra note 34, at 324; C.p.p. art. 63(1) (It.); Cass. Sez. I, La Placa, 
March 17, 2000.
605. C.p.p. art. 64(3) (It.).
606. Id. art. 350(7).
607. Id. arts. 64(2), 188.
608. NIHONKOKU K?????[K????] [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, ¶ 1 (Japan).
609. ASHIBE, supra note 463, at 230.
610. NIHONKOKU K?????[K????] [CONSTITUTION], art. 38, ¶¶ 2, 3 (Japan).
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The Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the prosecutor and the 
police must notify the suspect that “[he] is not required to make a statement 
against [his] will.”611 This provision is said to be enacted, though not 
necessarily required by Article 38(1) of the Japanese Constitution, to 
achieve the purpose of Article 38(1).612
10. Mexico
Article 20(2) of the Constitution provides: “In every criminal trial the 
accused shall enjoy the following guarantees: He may not be forced to be 
a witness against himself; wherefore denial of access or other means 
tending to this end is strictly prohibited.”613 “The [Federal Code of 
Criminal Procedure] provides that a warning be given to the detainee upon 
their arrest or while [in] custody, which include the right to remain silent 
or to speak only in the presence of counsel.”614
The police may not take formal statements from the suspect, but may 
take note of statements made by the suspect during the arrest or while in 
custody.615 The Code, however, prohibits these statements to be 
considered confessions, so they have less weight than statements taken by 
the prosecutor.616 “Only the prosecutor may question the suspect.”617
Confession by the defendant must be made voluntarily to be admissible.618
11. Russia
“In the post-communist era, the interrogation process has been plagued 
by corruption and abuse and thus frequently [criticized] by human rights 
611. See K?????????????[K??????] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 198, ¶ 2. (Japan).
612. ISAO SATO, JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 593 (vol. 1, 1983).
613. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, Diaro 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014, art. 20 ¶ 
2 (Mex.).
614. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 532, at 364; Código Federal de Procedimientos 
Penales [CFPP], art. 128, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 30-08-1934, última 
refomras DOF 09-06-2009 (Mex.).
615. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 532, at 364.
616. Id.; CFPP art. 287 (Mex.).
617. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 532, at 366.
618. Id.; CFPP art. 287 (Mex.).
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groups and international organizations.”619 The new Criminal Procedure 
Code enacted in 2002 attempted to address these deficiencies.620
The Russian Constitution guarantees both suspects and defendants the 
right not to incriminate themselves or their relatives.621 “[T]he Code 
affords both persons the right to give explanations and testimony and the 
right to refuse to do so.”622 “If a suspect or [a defendant] decides to provide 
testimony, he must be warned that his testimony may be used as evidence 
even if he later recants it.”623 “[T]he pretrial testimony of a suspect or [a 
defendant] is automatically inadmissible if given in the absence of defense 
counsel . . . and not later confirmed by him in court.”624
12. South Africa
Article 35 of the South African Constitution provides: 
Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offense has the 
right— (a) to remain silent; (b) to be informed promptly— (i) of the right 
to remain silent; and (ii) of the consequences of not remaining silent; (c) 
not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be 
used in evidence against that person.625
As the combined effect of the South African Constitution, the Criminal 
Procedure Act, and the Judges’ Rules, “whenever a person is arrested or 
detained[,] she must be promptly advised of her right,” including to remain 
silent and the right to consult with a legal counsel.626 “Evidence elicited 
during an interrogation that has not been preceded by the requisite warning 
will run the risk of exclusion.”627 Article 35(5) of the South African 
619. Newcombe, supra note 537, at 433.
620. Id.
621. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 51 
(Russ.).
622. Newcombe, supra note 537, at 434; UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS 
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UPK RF] [Criminal Procedure Code] arts. 46(4)(2), 46(4)(3) 
(Russ.).
623. Newcombe, supra note 537, at 434; UPK RF arts. 46(4)(2), 47(4)(3) (Russ.).
624. Newcombe, supra note 537, at 434.
625. S. AFR. CONST., art. 35, 1996.
626. Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 542, at 491.
627. Id. at 492.
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Constitution requires exclusion if the admission of evidence would render 
the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of 
justice.628
13. United Kingdom
“At common law[,] there [is] no legal obligation to answer police 
questions.”629 Parliament, however, “passed legislation [to impose] 
obligations to disclose information to investigators in connection with 
terrorism, serious fraud, and money-laundering investigation.”630
Thereafter, the European Court of Human Rights held that the use in 
criminal proceedings “of self-incriminating information [obtained] under 
threat of criminal penalties for non-disclosure . . . breached the right to a 
fair trial under article 6 of the ECHR.”631 Therefore, “[a]ll legislation . . . 
providing penalties for non-disclosure has now been amended to bring it 
into line” with the decision above.632
When the police have “reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
interviewee has committed [a crime], they must [inform] him of his right 
to remain silent” and the fact that it may harm his defense later.633
Evidence obtained by conduct “amounting to an impropriety undermining 
the fairness of the proceedings,” such as evidence obtained by misleading 
the suspect’s lawyer, can be excluded by the judge.634
628. Id.
629. Feldman, supra note 23, at 166.
630. Id. at 167.
631. Id.; Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 
331 (1996).
632. Feldman, supra note 23, at 167.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 170; R v. Mason [1987] 3 All ER 481 at 481 (Eng.).
